Ethics Unit 2
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Plato - Introduction
Introduction
Ethics is divided into three parts: the ethics of right and
wrong, the ethics of honour and dishonour, and the ethics of pleasure and pain.
For the most part, those who have thought most about our rationale for praising
or blaming and endorsing or condemning human conduct have described their
reasons under one or another of these divisions. We begin with the ethics of
right and wrong only because the historical record in philosophy begins with
Socrates and Plato, both of whom, as we saw in Unit 1, favoured the “right or
wrong” approach.
Exploring the history of these times may enrich your
understanding of ethical theory as it developed in ancient Greece and medieval
Europe. What is important to note here is that belief in the Greek gods (Zeus,
for example) was waning during the days of Socrates and Plato. However, those
in power wanted to prevent this decline. It is against this unstable backdrop
of the declining moral authority of religious doctrine that Socrates’ and
Plato’s theories, exploring a new source of moral authority, should be
considered.
Of Plato, the man, not much is known. As a young person, he
planned a political career but redirected his energies towards education and
philosophy when his teacher and friend, Socrates, was executed by the Athenian
city state for encouraging young people to question their religious beliefs.
After a decade or so of travel following Socrates’ death, Plato returned to
Athens and realized his dream of creating a great institution of learning. The
Academy, as Plato called it, was the western world’s first university, which
flourished for 907 years! It undoubtedly would have continued beyond 529 ad if
Constantine, then Holy Roman Emperor, had not shut it down because of its
secular, or what he, as a Christian would have considered pagan, pedagogical
foundations. We will now look at selections from Plato’s Republic[8] in some detail. In this, his most
famous dialogue, Plato works out a theory of justice in the voice of his
beloved teacher, Socrates.
Learning
Objectives
When you have completed Unit 2, you should be able to
1.
describe and explain Plato’s
Theory of the Good, his theory of the soul, and his allegory of the cave.
2.
classify Plato’s position
according to the distinctions laid out in Unit 1.
3.
describe and explain strengths and
weaknesses in Plato’s ethical model.
4.
compare and contrast St.
Augustine’s Christian-based ethics with Plato’s secular ethics.
Reading
Assignment
1.
In the course text, read the Republic selection,
including the editor’s introduction.
2.
Read the commentaries on the Republic in
this Study Guide. While you do, it may be helpful to refer
to the relevant sections of the textbook.
3.
Re-read the selection from the Republic to ensure you are fairly clear on what
Plato is writing about when he describes the conversation between Socrates and
his friends in this famous dialogue. Consider the following study questions
while you are re-reading.
Study Questions
1.
In what ways is justice
distinguished from injustice by Socrates and his companions?
2.
What similarities does Socrates
see between the individual’s ‘soul’ and the state?
3.
How does Socrates go about
defining the Good?
The Republic
The selection in the course text from the Republic is a reconstruction of several
different passages from the original dialogue, a lengthy work of ten books and
40 chapters.[9] For
the purpose of this commentary, we will consider the selection as falling more
or less naturally into seven parts, or discussions.
Psychological
Egoism
The selection in the course text from the Republic is a reconstruction of several
different passages from the original dialogue, a lengthy work of ten books and
40 chapters.[9] For the purpose of this commentary, we will
consider the selection as falling more or less naturally into seven parts, or
discussions.
1.
Psychological Egoism
Psychological Egoism is the view that humans are strictly
self-interested and unlikely to be, or incapable of being, motivated by
altruistic concern for the interests of others unless these are connected to
their own.
Psychological Egoism is the view that humans are strictly
self-interested and unlikely to be, or incapable of being, motivated by
altruistic concern for the interests of others unless these are connected to
their own. Morality, insofar as it assumes the likelihood or possibility of
altruism, is impossible. Psychological egoists [10] argue, however, that human beings are
quite able to refrain from harming one another and are even able to come to one
another’s aid because, it can be argued, both types of behaviour demonstrate
self-interest. Among philosophers, this view is most frequently ascribed to
Thomas Hobbes, [11] a seventeenth-century British philosopher
we look at later in the course, and to David Gauthier,[12] a contemporary Canadian philosopher,
but Plato was one of the first to consider it philosophically. In the Republic,
Thrasymachus, one of Socrates’ conversation partners, expresses the ancient
Greek version of psychological egoism. He argues that, with a cloak of
invisibility, any person would, without hesitation, violate rules of morality
in order to advance his or her own interests. His argument is known as “the
Ring of Gyges” thought experiment, and Plato considers it a serious challenge
to the assumptions of conventional morality. What, exactly, does this challenge
propose?
No individual thinks of doing right as good for him personally,
Thrasymachus is arguing, because he does wrong when he can get away with doing
so.
Thrasymachus argues that justness (assuming a just person is
someone who at least obeys the rules of society) is motivated by not wanting to
get caught and punished. In other words, justness is reducible to
self-interest. An unjust person, then, is someone who is less risk averse—less
worried about getting caught—when it comes to his or her own self-interest. But
give the just person immunity from detection and he or she will be as prepared
to abandon good and to harm others in pursuit of self-interest as the so-called
unjust person is without it. No individual thinks of doing right as good for
him personally, Thrasymachus is arguing, because he does wrong when he can get
away with doing so.
Here we have an instance of the distinction between right and
good. As the term ‘right’ is used here, it seems to refer to what one ought to
do as part of a collective, given that one’s behaviour affects the ability of
others to pursue their interests. The term ‘good’, on the other hand, seems to
refer to what one ought to do for oneself, as if one were all alone in the
world. It certainly seems true that what one ought to do as a member of a collective
might come into conflict with what one ought to do if one were all alone.
Psychological egoists argue that such conflicts must be settled by reference to
the interest of the individual, though enlightened egoists endorse the view
that attending to the needs and interests of others is always in the
individual’s long-term best interest. This way of distinguishing between the
right and the good is instructive, but we have not yet quite hit on the way
these terms are typically distinguished in moral philosophy and, indeed, by
Plato himself. As we will see, Plato is a rationalist for whom ‘right’ always refers
to what is determined by reason.[13]
Moral Rationalism: Rationalism is most widely regarded as a
theory of how we acquire knowledge. It states that knowledge is acquired solely
through the use of the intellect and its capacity for reason. In ethics,
rationalism is the view that we have a
prioriintuitions of moral truths.A priori intuitions are ideas that rationalists
argue we have even before we have had any sensory experience.
Moral Rationalism: Rationalism is most widely regarded as a
theory of how we acquire knowledge. It states that knowledge is acquired solely
through the use of the intellect and its capacity for reason. In ethics,
rationalism is the view that we have a
priori intuitions of
moral truths. A
priori intuitions are
ideas that rationalists argue we have even before we have had any sensory
experience.
Before proceeding, note must be taken of another important
distinction relied on by moral philosophers. Unit 1 introduced some crucial
terminology, including the distinction between normative anddescriptive claims. This distinction applies to
propositions: either a proposition is normative or descriptive or some
combination of the two. If it is descriptive, it reports on how things happen
to be. “Humans kill one another for pleasure” is a descriptive claim—a claim
about how things happen to be. Few would accept it as a normative claim,
however. As a normative claim, it would mean humans ought to—should or
must—kill one another for pleasure.
We need to keep this distinction in mind when thinking about
psychological egoism. Some claims of psychological egoism could very well be
true descriptively. That is, it might happen to be true that all or most human
beings are solely or mainly motivated by selfish drives and impulses. However,
it does not follow that they ought to be. Even if psychological egoism also
claimed human beings could not be motivated by concern for others, it would not
follow they ought to be selfishly motivated. While “ought” implies can, “can,”
on its own, never implies ought.
Think of the common earthworm, whose behaviour is determined by
its instinct for self-preservation. Ask yourself whether earthworms ought to
act self-interestedly. If human beings are self-interested in the same way
earthworms are, then morality itself might not make any sense. There is little
disagreement among theorists with the descriptive claim that much human
conduct, perhaps even most, is motivated by selfish interest. But there is a
great deal of disagreement with the descriptive claim humans are incapable of
being motivated by altruistic concern for others. Only this second claim
renders morality irrelevant in the way most psychological egoists would like.
However, it is very difficult to establish as a matter of fact.
Most people find themselves rejecting Thrasymachus’s skepticism
and cynicism about morality when they read the Republic. Yet, simply
disagreeing is never enough in philosophy. If you disagree with Thrasymachus’s
take on what really motivates so-called just behaviour, think about your
reasons. Are you a descriptive, though not a normative, psychological egoist?
Do you reject both forms of psychological egoism? If you have religious
beliefs, how do they inform your assessment of Thrasymachus’s view of morality?
As the commentary proceeds, you may find it helpful to re-read
the relevant sections. Next, we take up Thrasymachus’s attempt to spin his
psychological egoism into a theory of justice, along with Socrates’ response.
Theory of Justice
Pierre Elliot Trudeau, a former Prime Minister of Canada, made
it his aim, as head of state, to bring about a “just society.” The idea of a
just society has been a universal focus of many philosophers in the world’s
history. The Republic can be considered one of the first and
most important attempts at exploring and laying down the theory of a just
state—though one which has many important differences from Trudeau’s vision.
Thrasymachus plays a major role in the dialectic—a
form of reasoning that proceeds by way of question and answer—by presenting a
challenge to those who believe in the possibility of a just society. He would
question, if not sarcastically reply to Trudeau, that his ambition is futile.
In what follows we will see why.
The Thrasymachus discussion divides into two: justice as the
interest of the stronger and justice as inferior to injustice. Each stands as a
possible theory of justice, which Socrates critically
evaluates.
1.
Justice as the Advantage of the Stronger
Learning Activity
Reread the selection from Book I (pp. 31-42) with an eye to how propositions are formed, clarified, and then critically examined. What hard questions does Socrates put to Thrasymachus? Pause now and start a list of what you think these questions are.
Reread the selection from Book I (pp. 31-42) with an eye to how propositions are formed, clarified, and then critically examined. What hard questions does Socrates put to Thrasymachus? Pause now and start a list of what you think these questions are.
First, without subjecting your existing beliefs to some very
hard questions, you cannot be confident that they are true. Second, when you
want to form a true belief about something, you must consider all sides before rendering a judgement:
there are always more than the standard two!
Thrasymachus defines justice as “what is to the advantage of the
stronger party.” Recall the approach described in Unit 1 when Socrates’
conversation with Euthyphro was examined. Socrates asked Euthyphro to define
piety and, as Euthyphro offered various definitions, Socrates showed their
defects. In the end, you may recall, no conclusion was reached. But in the Republic, a final judgement
is rendered. It is customary to explain this difference as a consequence of Euthyphro being written at an earlier date than
theRepublic. In
the later dialogues, Plato began to move away from certain views of his
teacher, Socrates. In any event, the use of antagonistic conversation partners
in the Republic is designed to propel Socrates’
analysis of the idea of justice and a just society to the truth. The
assumptions here are twofold. First, without subjecting your existing beliefs
to some very hard questions, you cannot be confident that they are true.
Second, when you want to form a true belief about something, you must consider all sides before rendering a judgement:
there are always more than the standard two! This, in a nutshell, describes the Socratic Method.
Thrasymachus claims that those who rule are the strongest or
most powerful persons in society. He then argues that, since they alone
determine what shall count as obeying the rules (the premise or support of his argument), what
society recognizes as justice reduces to whatever is in the interest of the
strongest or ruling persons in society (the conclusion of his argument). Note that, in order
for the conclusion to follow or be supported by the premise, Thrasymachus must
assume that no ruler would consider any conduct to be “obeying the rules” if it
inhibits his or her self-interest. This assumption is, of course, based on the
principle of psychological egoism which will be graphically illustrated when we
examine the Ring of Gyges thought experiment (Book II).
In this section, Socrates first calls Thrasymachus’s argument
into question by establishing that rulers may err in not recognizing what is in
their own best interest. Admitting the point, Thrasymachus is shown by Socrates
to be apparently committed to the claim that it is both right and wrong to obey
one’s ruler since, on the one hand, the weaker must take orders from the
stronger and on the other, justice implies the weaker must act in the best
interest of the stronger. In cases where a ruler is mistaken about his or her
own best interest, what are subjects to do if they want to act rightly or justly?
Thrasymachus’s first stab at a theory of justice, since it appears to imply a
contradiction, cannot answer this question and, as such, is not a very good
theory of a just society.
Cleitophon attempts to rescue Thrasymachus from this quandary.
Perhaps, Cleitophon says, the subject is merely required to do what rulers believe is in their self-interest, even though
they may be mistaken in that belief. In this case, however, the second
requirement of just conduct actually drops out and justice reduces to simply
obeying the rules one’s rulers make. Even Thrasymachus rejects this definition
and insists on carrying out his own rescue.
Learning Activity
Pause here for a moment and think about how Thrasymachus responds to Socrates’ charge that he has contradicted himself and consider how Cleitophon’s remarks aid in the clarification of what exactly is at issue. Re-read if necessary.
Pause here for a moment and think about how Thrasymachus responds to Socrates’ charge that he has contradicted himself and consider how Cleitophon’s remarks aid in the clarification of what exactly is at issue. Re-read if necessary.
Socrates then uses Thrasymachus’s own line of defence against
the charge that his theory of justice is self-contradictory to instead show
that it is false. In doing so, Plato, in Socrates’ voice, raises interesting
questions about the nature of professions. For example, it is accepted by all
parties to the conversation that the role of professionals (e.g., physicians,
naval officers) is to look after the interests of others and not primarily to
make money. Right off the bat then, Socrates has elicited from Thrasymachus a
point which seems to call into question his psychological egoism. It is hardly
surprising, once his commitment to psychological egoism has been unsettled,
that Thrasymachus’s theory of justice, which depends on it, is in trouble.
Socrates concludes and, at this point, Thrasymachus agrees that
it must be the case that every craftsman and art seeks, not to bring advantage
to itself, since by definition, it has no deficiencies, but to the subject on
which it is exercised. (36) In other words, craftsmen do not act on their own
interests but in the interest (best interest) of the subject of their art. From
here, Socrates depends on an argument from analogy to slide the point about
medicine and seafaring over to the context of government. Note how he draws an
analogy between the craftsman or artisan and rulers and how this undermines
Thrasymachus’ argument.
Arguments from analogyseek to support a controversial conclusion about one thing by
showing that it is very similar to a much less controversial conclusion about
something else.
Arguments from analogy seek to support a controversial conclusion
about one thing by showing that it is very similar to a much less controversial
conclusion about something else.
It is not difficult to see at this point where Socrates is
headed. Recall Thrasymachus’s theory of justice: What is just or right is
nothing other than what is to the advantage of the stronger party. And recall
Thrasymachus’s identification of rulers as the strongest party in a society.
Assuming he wishes to be rational, if he accepts Socrates’ argument from
analogy, it seems he must reject his theory of justice. Socrates’ argument
about government from analogy with medicine and seafaring implies rulers must
never act to their own advantage when it conflicts with what is to the
advantage of their subjects. Thrasymachus’s theory of justice presupposes that
rulers will always act in their self-interest even when it conflicts with the
interests of their subjects. Therefore, the argument from analogy indicates
Thrasymachus’s theory of justice is false.
Socrates has got a lot riding on his assumption that politics is
like medicine and seafaring. Pause here to recall or reread how Thrasymachus
responds to Socrates’ effort to show his theory of justice is false.
So far, Socrates has enlisted two sorts of moral reasoning in
his critical evaluation of Thrasymachus’s argument from psychological egoism.
In the first case, Socrates uses the sort of reasoning we shall find most
prominent in deontology. If your theory implies a contradiction, then it must
be rejected regardless of any merits it may have. This is because, ethically
speaking, no theory of how we ought to act that implies a contradiction can
tell us what to do, nor be action-guiding—something all good ethical theories
must be. Another reason why it must be rejected can be seen if we examine the
consequences of accepting a contradiction. If I say that helping the poor is
just and that not helping the poor is just, I’ve just said that justice can
result in any consequence whatsoever. If we accept a contradiction, anything is
justified, or nothing is justifiable. Accepting a contradiction makes your
claims empty.
Once Thrasymachus has amended his theory to avoid
self-contradiction, Socrates takes a different tack. Assuming that no
professional can be considered truly a practitioner of his or her craft unless
focused on the subject matter of that craft and its interest, rather than his
or her own interests, Socrates relies on consequentialist, or teleological,
reasoning. The consequences, for example, of physicians focussing on their own
financial gain as well as, or instead of, their patients’ health, would be
disastrous. Of course, Socrates concludes his part of this discussion with
Thrasymachus by assuming that there would be similar disastrous results were
political rulers to depart from these professional standards. And, as you will
have noted, Thrasymachus vigorously disagrees. As a result of disputing these
consequences, Thrasymachus implies ruling is more like running a commercial
business than commanding a ship or restoring or maintaining health, and so
rejects Socrates’ argument from analogy. In doing so, Thrasymachus holds fast
to his initial theory of justice: “[people] who reproach justice do so because
they are afraid not of doing it but of suffering it.” (38)
2.
Justice as Inferior to Injustice
At the end of the previous section, Thrasymachus concludes that
injustice is superior to justice in terms of strength, freedom and power. What
is right is simply what serves the interest of the stronger party.
Note how Socrates, in response, can accuse Thrasymachus of
ignoring the definition of the craftsman that they had earlier agreed on.
According to that definition, the craftsman is devoted to the interests of his
or her subject, not to making money. Socrates disputes, therefore,
Thrasymachus’s assumption that making money is an art or skill in the requisite
sense. In doing so, he undermines Thrasymachus’s argument that ruling is more
like commercial business (the so-called art of making money) than the practice
of medicine. At the same time, he exposes how many people appear to win
arguments by ignoring such things as previous admissions or agreements. It is
one reason why Socrates wanted to distinguish himself from the sophists who had
the reputation of making the weaker argument seem stronger. Using trickery is
not a philosophical tool, because it prevents us from arriving at truth. This
section, then, also serves as a reminder that sound thinking is not about
winning arguments, but about seeking clarity, well-established propositions and
a commitment to consistency and coherence. Socrates then brings the
conversation back around to his initial point, that ruling cannot involve the
ruler’s own interest and, therefore, justice cannot refer to what Thrasymachus
considers the interest of the stronger. Your text picks up the conversation
when Socrates suggests they re-consider Thrasymachus’s conclusion that justice
is inferior to injustice.
Thrasymachus has argued that rulers who force their interests on
subjects without regard for their well-being are “superior in character and
intelligence.” Returning to the definition of craft or skill both had earlier
agreed on, Socrates starts to analyze craftsmanship in terms of function and
virtue (40, 41). Each function of a craftsman can be performed well or poorly,
as we can say of the musician’s craft or skill. His or her ability to discover
the correct pitch at which an instrument’s strings should be tuned and to
successfully tune the instrument determines how well or virtuously his or her
function is performed. Further, since each pitch limits how a string should
sound, how tightly it needs to be strung, the virtue of craftsmen is determined
by how well they understand the subject of their craft, not by how far they can
assert themselves in exploiting a craft. Character and intelligence in
craftsmanship therefore implies avoidance of what Cornford refers to as
“unlimited self assertion.”[14] Continuing, Cornford writes: “The
unjust [person], who acknowledges no measure or limit, because there is no
limit to getting more and more for yourself at others’ expense and that is his
object, is, by all analogy, exhibiting rather a lack of intelligence and
character.”[15]
Notice how Socrates moves the analysis to a discussion of the
soul and its happiness to finalize his criticism of Thrasymachus. He has shown
Thrasymachus that he has misunderstood the nature of the subject matter
(justice). This places Thrasymachus in an embarrassing position. He either must
admit that he was outright wrong, or confused (and he is not as intelligent as
he presents himself); or he must admit that he has intentionally suppressed
what he in fact knows in order to win an argument. There appears to be no way
out of the dilemma; so he leaves.
Book II shifts the discussion to an issue that has plagued those
who have thought about justice ever since. Glaucon presents the challenge to
Socrates. Ensure that you are clear about this challenge and how it differs
from the one Thrasymachus presented.
The Free Rider
Problem
The tale of the Ring of Gyges has generated, among others, the
problem of the free rider. Many times during the course, once we have developed
a more or less settled concept of the principles we think ought to govern our
behaviour and treatment of one another, we will also see that the problem
Thrasymacus raises—that people act only as if they are committed to the
principle, not because they are actually motivated by that principle—because
the individual who fakes being guided by such principles can enrich himself or
herself at the expense of others far more by doing so. Wrongdoing is profitable
when a man is completely unjust but has a reputation for justice. On one count,
Socrates seems to have defeated Thrasymachus’ argument by showing that
injustice does not in fact “pay better” than justice when both are out in the
open, but on a second count, he has not shown that it pays better when people
can hide their actual injustice from public scrutiny. Glaucon recognizes this
and returns to defend Thrasymachus’ argument from a different point of view. If
people could be assured of getting away with whatever behaviour they chose,
both the seemingly just and the unjust would happily act unjustly (in their own
selfish interest at the expense of others). What Glaucon is doing is drawing a
parallel between the cloak of invisibility and public respectability. Those who
have public respectability because of their reputation for justice are in fact
no different than Gyges. In contemporary moral philosophy this is known as the
”Free Rider” problem.
If people can get a free ride (get credit for being good or just
etc., while actually being the opposite), they will. To address this argument,
Socrates considers whether people will recognize that justice is intrinsically
good or valuable and will act justly for its own sake, as a consequence.
Glaucon’s challenge then directly opposes this proposition, putting Socrates on
the defensive. What must he demonstrate to prove his proposition? How can he
prove that being just is good in itself. Clues about how he will proceed have
already been given in the previous discussion about the nature and function of
the soul. Socrates’ strategy is anticipated in our last included section of
Book II where a parallel between justice in the soul and in the state is
anticipated.
In the next section, excerpts from Book IV, we see how Socrates
understands the relationship between the individual and the state, as he moves
between the two contexts. The state is a macrocosm of the individual (the
microcosm).
Both Socrates and Plato believed that the human psyche, today
what we would call human psychology, is structured on the same principles that
structure the state. It follows then, on their view, that if a state were badly
or unharmoniously structured, only bad or unharmonious individuals could emerge
from it. And so, while later versions of the “right and wrong” approach to
ethics became more individualistic, on Plato’s account, individual persons are
derivative; the state alone is originative, and preservation of its integrity
must come first in all ethical deliberations.
Ethical theories are generally characterized by either a
commitment toindividualism or
tocollectivism.
Ethical theories are generally characterized by either a
commitment toindividualism or
to collectivism.
Prior to the seventeenth century, ethical theories were
predominantly collectivist. After the eighteenth century, they were
predominantly individualist. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were
transitional from collectivism to individualism as the primary context of moral
concern and were punctuated by a great deal of political unrest. Plato’s
theories are not made irrelevant as a consequence, however. Collectivist
approaches are far from dead, as we see in more community oriented theories
(e.g., communitarianism). The more you study ethics, the more you will become
aware of the growing disenchantment with and criticism of individualist
approaches.
Ensure that you can follow and reconstruct Socrates’ argument,
as it moves from references to the forms and the three natural classes of the
city, through to the conclusion that injustice is a state of unnatural, i.e.,
improper control. Be sure to note how he draws the parallel between the state
and the soul, as consisting of three parts and as having to achieve proper
balance between the parts. We’ll discuss this a bit later. Proper balance can
only be achieved through proper rule, which in both the case of the soul and of
the city, is the rule of the rational part. Once you can explain why Socrates
thinks this way, how does his understanding set him up to argue for the
intrinsic value of justice?
The Soul
Before moving to the next section or book, note how Socrates
moves discussion to the topic of the soul or what we would consider psychology
today. As a twenty-first-century student of ethics, you have the benefit of a
well-developed science of human psychology. Most Western readers today are
familiar with Freud or, if not with him, then with his groundbreaking theories
of human mental life. Terms such as ego, id, and Oedipus complex, all come to
us from Freud. His way of carving up the mind continues to shape generations of
thought on behavioural motivation. But most of human history occurred before
Freud and his theories. Prior to developments in the middle– to late–nineteenth
century, moral psychology, as it was known, was carried on primarily by
philosophers. William James, for instance, was a highly respected late
nineteenth-century American philosopher whose work was mainly focused on
psychology.[16] In Plato’s time, philosophers were the
principal researchers on all subjects of interest to human beings. So, when
Plato explores the nature of the human soul or psyche, he is giving a
scientific explanation (as it was then understood) of human mental life. He is
laying the foundations of what will one day become modern science.
In part, he develops this science of the psyche to explain how
the mind or soul works, so that he can eventually show why it aims at the good
and justice. Once he does this, he can show why it is rational to seek the good
and justice. This part of the argument can be considered foundational in the
sense that it establishes how the pursuit of the good can occur. It does not
directly tell us what to do, but forms the conceptual support for telling us
what what it is possible to do and what drives us to be ethical. We call this
aspect of ethical theory, metaethics.
For Socrates and his conversation partners, the soul, like the
state, is comprised of three elements: an appetitive element, a spirited
element, and an intellectual element. Here Socrates examines the question of
how these elements ought to be arranged in the soul in order to facilitate a life
lived well—a good life, according to Socrates. As an aside, try to keep this
goal of the good life in mind, since it will eventually disappear from ethical
theory in later historical developments. Socrates describes people as generally
dominated by one or another of these three elements. Those dominated by
appetite pursue their impulses for pleasure, those dominated by spirit satisfy
social and political ambitions and desire for fame, and those dominated by the
intellect pursue their love of knowledge and understanding for its own sake.
Similarly, Socrates assumes that the just society is divided into three
classes, each suited to one or another of the characters noted under the
three-part division in the soul. The main question for Socrates, however, is how
the relationships between the elements should be arranged. Some societies
resolve this question by instituting severe class distinctions, others by
permitting all citizens a great deal of freedom to pursue their different
interests. How does Socrates see the relationships? You will be asked this
again in the study questions that follow.
We can now focus on Books VI and VII. Now that Socrates has
concluded that injustice turns out to be quite a terrible thing, he is
challenged to give a more positive account of justice. Socrates argues that, of
the three kinds of pleasure, the best belongs to that part of the soul whereby
we gain understanding and knowledge, and the man in whom that part predominates
will have the pleasantest life. And Plato concludes this portion of the
dialogue by introducing a metaphor which will play an important role later on.
He attempts to clear up what he takes to be confusion in the minds of most
people about the nature of pleasure and pain. In answering the study questions
that follow, you will be asked to recount what Plato regards as the problem and
how he would resolve it.
Study Questions
Before proceeding to the next section, answer the following
study questions. Answering study questions as you go along will help you to
retain information and think more deeply about what you have read.
1.
Define psychological egoism and
explain how Thrasymachus uses the Ring of Gyges thought experiment to
illustrate psychological egoism. Present two events from the news: one in which
you think the main figure or figures acted egoistically and one in which he,
she, or they acted unselfishly. Justify your choices.
2.
Restate, in your own words,
Thrasymachus’s argument that justice is whatever is to the advantage of the
stronger. Likewise, restate Socrates’ objections to this argument.
3.
Restate, in your own words,
Socrates’ argument against Thrasymachus’s view that justice is never as
beneficial or rewarding or pays better than injustice.
4.
Describe the three elements of the
soul according to Socrates, and describe how they are related.
5.
How does Socrates model the
relationship among people with the three elements of the soul in his just
society?
Platonic
Rationalism
In the concluding exchange of the discussion about the soul
(from Book I), Socrates and his conversation partners discuss the function of
the soul, a conversation that will eventually lead to a discussion about the
difference between knowledge gained through the senses and that which is gained
through reason. This line of thought—that our sensory experiences are
frequently unreliable guides to the facts or truth of what is really going on
inside or around us—would also soon (historically speaking) develop into a
doctrine known as Rationalism. Rationalism, as was noted above, is a position
on how we come to acquire knowledge about our world.[17] Rationalism tells us knowledge (though
not information) can only be acquired through reasoning; never through sensory
experience. This is because, the rationalist argues, knowledge refers to that
which is certain—unchanging. What we experience through our senses as
information or data is neither. But things we believe as a consequence of
correct reasoning, like the mathematician’s claim that 5+2=7, are indisputable.
Rationalism, as a position on how we come to have knowledge of things, is the
basis of the secular “right and wrong” approach to morality that Plato takes.
Keep this in mind as you follow the development of ideas. It will help if you
do, because Socrates, like those who follow his systematic approach, builds his
case gradually and systematically.
Recall the challenge to Socrates: his interlocutors want him to
show that there are goods that are good for their own sakes (goods
in-themselves) and not just good for bringing about something else
(instrumental good). Glaucon used this distinction to challenge Socrates to
show that there is such a thing as a good in-itself or that there is something
intrinsically good. This is the point of the tale of Gyges and his ring:
challenging Socrates to prove that justice is intrinsically valuable, such that
it will be acted upon by people even when they can get away with acting
unjustly.
Plato’s theory or model of the soul, which mirrors his theory of
the state, is a device Socrates uses to show that there is such a thing as a
good in-itself. It may strike you as odd, or at least old-fashioned sounding.
Worse, it might strike you as highly discriminatory or classist. But it might
be argued that we do in fact conceive of our psyches in much the same way today
as Plato did in his. We talk about “treating ourselves”, when under a lot of
strain, to a chocolate sundae, a day off for golf, a bubble bath or massage.
One part of the self treats another part of itself as something to be rewarded
(or punished). We also talk about ambition, about getting ahead, about the
importance of networking in order to get ahead. This is assigning one part of
ourselves (say, the will) as the ruler who tells the other parts to prepare for
the effort. Finally, there is a host of intellectual and metaphysical
interests—the deep questions that seem to drive some people at least to pursue
answers, even when doing so is not to their benefit financially or politically.
These phenomena mirror Plato’s reference to the three parts of the soul, in
particular the rational part as the ruler of the soul. While the terminology is
always changing, in many respects, how we think about ourselves as moral
creatures has remained unchanged over the last 3000 years.
Socrates’ reason for insisting on the authority of the
intellectual part of the soul is a reason that someone whose soul is dominated
by the appetitive element or the spirited element may find unpersuasive. It is
a straightforwardly moral reason: “It is better for everyone . . .” and one
that, as we will see later in the course, appeals to an alternative basis for
morality than the rationalist one Plato otherwise appeals to. Of note in
Socrates’ conclusion is his view that the ‘right’ or just person will treat the
body as a mere instrument of the intellect. Health, strength, and beauty he
will value only insofar as they bring soundness of mind, and you will find him
keeping his bodily frame in tune always for the sake of the resulting concord
in the soul.
Note now how Socrates has framed the discussion in preparation
to respond to Glaucon’s challenge. To respond to the challenge of showing that
justice is a good in itself, he has brought in a discussion of the tripartite
soul as a meta-ethical ground or foundation. His analysis, then, will be
structured in accordance with what the various parts of the soul take to be
good.
Study Questions
Before proceeding to the next section, answer the following
study questions. Answering study questions as you go along will help you to
retain information and think more deeply about what you have read.
1.
Define psychological egoism and
explain how Thrasymachus uses the Ring of Gyges thought experiment to
illustrate psychological egoism. Present two events from the news: one in which
you think the main figure or figures acted egoistically and one in which he,
she, or they acted unselfishly. Justify your choices.
2.
Restate, in your own words,
Thrasymachus’s argument that justice is whatever is to the advantage of the
stronger. Likewise, restate Socrates’ objections to this argument.
3.
Restate, in your own words,
Socrates’ argument against Thrasymachus’s view that justice is never as
beneficial or rewarding or pays better than injustice.
4.
Describe the three elements of the
soul according to Socrates, and describe how they are related.
5.
How does Socrates model the
relationship among people with the three elements of the soul in his just
society?
Platonic
Rationalism
In the concluding exchange of the discussion about the soul
(from Book I), Socrates and his conversation partners discuss the function of
the soul, a conversation that will eventually lead to a discussion about the
difference between knowledge gained through the senses and that which is gained
through reason. This line of thought—that our sensory experiences are
frequently unreliable guides to the facts or truth of what is really going on
inside or around us—would also soon (historically speaking) develop into a
doctrine known as Rationalism. Rationalism, as was noted above, is a position
on how we come to acquire knowledge about our world.[17] Rationalism tells us knowledge (though not information)
can only be acquired through reasoning; never through sensory experience. This
is because, the rationalist argues, knowledge refers to that which is
certain—unchanging. What we experience through our senses as information or
data is neither. But things we believe as a consequence of correct reasoning,
like the mathematician’s claim that 5+2=7, are indisputable. Rationalism, as a
position on how we come to have knowledge of things, is the basis of the
secular “right and wrong” approach to morality that Plato takes. Keep this in
mind as you follow the development of ideas. It will help if you do, because
Socrates, like those who follow his systematic approach, builds his case
gradually and systematically.
Recall the challenge to Socrates: his interlocutors want him to
show that there are goods that are good for their own sakes (goods
in-themselves) and not just good for bringing about something else
(instrumental good). Glaucon used this distinction to challenge Socrates to
show that there is such a thing as a good in-itself or that there is something
intrinsically good. This is the point of the tale of Gyges and his ring:
challenging Socrates to prove that justice is intrinsically valuable, such that
it will be acted upon by people even when they can get away with acting
unjustly.
Plato’s theory or model of the soul, which mirrors his theory of
the state, is a device Socrates uses to show that there is such a thing as a
good in-itself. It may strike you as odd, or at least old-fashioned sounding.
Worse, it might strike you as highly discriminatory or classist. But it might
be argued that we do in fact conceive of our psyches in much the same way today
as Plato did in his. We talk about “treating ourselves”, when under a lot of
strain, to a chocolate sundae, a day off for golf, a bubble bath or massage.
One part of the self treats another part of itself as something to be rewarded
(or punished). We also talk about ambition, about getting ahead, about the
importance of networking in order to get ahead. This is assigning one part of
ourselves (say, the will) as the ruler who tells the other parts to prepare for
the effort. Finally, there is a host of intellectual and metaphysical
interests—the deep questions that seem to drive some people at least to pursue
answers, even when doing so is not to their benefit financially or politically.
These phenomena mirror Plato’s reference to the three parts of the soul, in
particular the rational part as the ruler of the soul. While the terminology is
always changing, in many respects, how we think about ourselves as moral
creatures has remained unchanged over the last 3000 years.
Socrates’ reason for insisting on the authority of the
intellectual part of the soul is a reason that someone whose soul is dominated
by the appetitive element or the spirited element may find unpersuasive. It is
a straightforwardly moral reason: “It is better for everyone . . .” and one
that, as we will see later in the course, appeals to an alternative basis for
morality than the rationalist one Plato otherwise appeals to. Of note in
Socrates’ conclusion is his view that the ‘right’ or just person will treat the
body as a mere instrument of the intellect. Health, strength, and beauty he
will value only insofar as they bring soundness of mind, and you will find him
keeping his bodily frame in tune always for the sake of the resulting concord
in the soul.
Note now how Socrates has framed the discussion in preparation
to respond to Glaucon’s challenge. To respond to the challenge of showing that
justice is a good in itself, he has brought in a discussion of the tripartite
soul as a meta-ethical ground or foundation. His analysis, then, will be
structured in accordance with what the various parts of the soul take to be
good.
The Good
We have already read references to the form of justice, which
have prepared us to hear about the Theory of the Forms. In this section,
Socrates alludes to his Theory of the Forms. How is it, when we see a species
of tree completely new to us, we nevertheless recognize it as a tree? It may
have needles instead of leaves, be blue instead of green, may grow sideways
from a rock instead of vertically from the ground yet we know it is a tree.
How? Socrates, and perhaps to a lesser extent Plato, believe there must be a
reality in which the pure ideas of all things exist. This, they think, was the
best explanation of our ability to recognize things as specific types even if
we have never seen them before. The pure idea of a thing is of the thing’s
‘essence’—its nature stripped of all changeable properties. The existence of
the form of a thing informs the matter that constitutes the particular tree, or
chair, or river, and enables human’s to recognize of types of things. What we
have, then, is a distinction between matter and form, where matter is the
physical stuff that we perceive with our sense and forms are what we conceive
with our intellect.
Socrates’ Theory of the Forms becomes somewhat more difficult to
apply in the case of ethics, but the central idea is the same. Our ability to
recognize just or ethical or moral acts or people or policies is made possible
by the existence of the forms of Justice (yes, with a capital J) and of the
Good. The pure idea of Justice denotes its essential criteria alone. Plato, in
the voice of Socrates, defines justice or identifies its form earlier in the
dialogue. “Plato argues justice in the state is the condition in which its
rational, emotional [spirited], and appetitive parts all do their own work; he
infers that justice in the soul will be its analogous condition.”[18] When it comes to defining Good in this
section, Socrates is much more circumspect, claiming he does not know it but
knows only its “offspring.” It is fairly clear that Socrates has an
understanding of the Good, so his circumspection is the result of realizing
that others will not be able to share his understanding, until they have gone
through a certain process. We, consequently, should not be in too great a hurry
to demand of Socrates that he define the Good and show how it makes justice a
good in itself.
Socrates presents the analogy of vision to help explain to his
conversation partners just what he has in mind. He will present an equally
indirect explanation—the Allegory of the Cave (also called a parable)—in the
last part of the selection. He concludes from this analogy that the Good cannot
be known in the same way other things, even other moral characteristics, can be
known. For this would be like being able to “see” light without any light. The
Good, Socrates argues, is the means by which morality is known and is therefore
not itself a moral characteristic.
The Allegory of
the Cave
No theoretical device of Plato’s has been written about nearly
as much as his allegory of the Cave. The Allegory of the Cave is introduced by
Socrates to illustrate how he conceives the process of enlightenment by which
the most intelligent members of society acquire the authority to instruct their
fellow citizens in the good life. It is crucial, however, to note two things.
First, Socrates believes that most people could experience some degree of
enlightenment themselves simply by exposing their beliefs to critical
scrutiny—if not their own then that of others. Second, recall Socrates’
arguments refuting psychological egoism. Even though Socrates believes a
minority of people in society have exceptional intellectual power and that they
ought to instruct others, he in no way supports the view they should do so in
their own interests. He has made the point clear throughout: philosophers must
use their intellectual authority to benefit others, not themselves. This
pursuit of the Good as a Good in-itself is not a personal good or an idea of a
good that a group of people decide on or even experience as Good.
According to the allegory, most people’s moral beliefs can be
compared to the error many audience members made at the very first moving
picture screenings in Victorian England when, seeing a mighty locomotive coming
at them on the screen, filmgoers ducked and screamed with terror. They mistake
what is derived from the Good for the Good itself. They take a representation
as the thing itself. So then, what is this Good itself? Socrates never gives us
a direct answer; indeed, he tells us that it is the most difficult question to
answer. He does tell us that it is a form, so that what we are looking for is
the Form of the Good. As a form, the Good can only be grasped intellectually,
not through the senses or empirically. Moreover, according to the Divided Line
analogy, it is a form that gives rise to or causes all other lower order forms;
it is the ultimate form. This means that no description that depends on
references to lower order forms will be adequate to capture the Form of the
Good, because, in the order of explanation, that which is explained by the Good
cannot be used to explain the Good. This is a bit tricky. Many religious
thinkers have also said this about God. God, conceived as the ultimate cause
(Creator) and the good, cannot be understood by those He creates, because they
are the consequences or effects of His creative act. If we tried to explain the
cause by referring to its effects, it would be like trying to explain why a cue
ball in billiards moved the way it did by referring to the coloured balls it
hit. We would be saying that the cue ball was caused to move by the coloured
ball, because the coloured ball needed the cue ball to hit it in just the right
way to send it to a pocket. Causes cannot be explained by reference to their
effects.
There are two main points to note in this last section: that the
Good cannot be grasped directly and that, once it is grasped, you cannot expect
others to grasp it, without going through a process, a process like coming out
of a cave and seeing the sun for the first time. This process is a rational one
that demands that you shed all dependence on the senses and work entirely in
the realm of reason or the intelligible. Socrates provides hints of how this is
done, as he describes the mathematical realm as a purely intellectual arena.
Like pure mathematical ideas, the forms must be understood in terms of their
essences, not their instances (e.g., concrete examples of trees, humans, and so
on). When we are able to do this, we begin to understand how some forms may
have no sensual instance, for example, the form of difference or sameness
(Plato deals with these forms elsewhere). The forms of truth and justice are
like these pure intellectual forms and must be understood accordingly. It is no
wonder, then, that, once you have understood the Good and justice, others will
not be able to understand or believe you, because they will depend on empirical
examples. By implication, assuming that Socrates knows the Good, his interlocutors
are still unable to understand, because they are like the cave dwellers who
cannot see and are afraid to see.
In the end, one could certainly argue that Socrates has not got
much further in the Republic than he had at the end of the Euthyphro. All he seems to
have gained is knowlege that, once someone has seen the Good, common morality
by comparison is mired in darkness. His theory was supposed to tell us why
justice is a good in itself. We have some sense of why he believes this to be
the case. Justice, as a pure form and offspring of the Good is separate from
all the senses and is not subject to the forces that direct the body, the
appetites or the passions. Therefore, when we understand justice correctly
through the intellect, the good connected to that understanding cannot be an
instrumental good, or a good that is dependent on satisfying some bodily
desire, appetite, or passion. This conclusion, then, seems to imply a further
conclusion; Justice must be a good in itself. In the Study Questions that
follow, you will be asked to comment on what you think the significance of this
allegory is for Socrates’ and Plato’s rationalism.
We have come to the end of our Plato section.
Review Questions
1.
“Socrates and Plato were
rationalists.” Present two sets of evidence from the text: one that supports
and and another that might challenge this assessment. Is one case stronger than
the other?
2.
How does Socrates deal with the
“Free Rider” problem? Is his argument convincing? Consider the fact that he
does not tell us directly what the Good is.
3.
What is Socrates’ theory of the
Good? Do you accept Socrates’ explanation for defining the Good indirectly?
Why, or why not?
4.
What is Socrates’ theory of the
Forms? To what extent do you agree or disagree with it? How does it support his
argument that justice is a good in itself.
5.
“Is the Allegory of the Cave a
good description of the human condition?”
Introduction
The history of the development and spread of Christianity is
both well known and little known. Most Christians know the story of how their
religion started and how its early followers were executed by the Romans during
the reigns of Nero and Caligula. Fewer are familiar with what happened after
Jesus Christ was executed and before the executions of his followers began in
earnest; fewer still with what happened to Christianity the end of the period
of persecution to the Middle Ages in Europe when common knowledge generally
includes the belief that most Europeans were Christians. How did most of Europe
become Christian? What about other parts of the world? Was there only one kind
of Christianity, Roman Catholicism, before the Reformation? Why Roman Catholic anyway? The very early
history of the Catholic Church is as fascinating as that of any of the world’s
religions, and St. Augustine played a major role in that story.
While Augustine was primarily influenced by the works and
followers of Plato, it is important to realize that he wrote long after the
works of another great ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, had had plenty of
time to influence many generations of Greek and Arab thinkers. Aristotle was a
favourite student of Plato, but he nevertheless disagreed with his teacher on
many fundamental points. But Aristotle’s works were not available in Latin
until many centuries after St. Augustine’s death when St. Thomas Aquinas
translated the Arab versions. We will be considering Aristotle’s moral
philosophy in Part II when we look at the “ethics of virtue and vice” approach
to moral reasoning.
Augustine is very concerned about happiness. His ideas about
ethics are also Platonic. Recall that, in theRepublic, Plato argues (in
the voice of Socrates) that injustice does not “pay better” (brings greater
advantage) than justice and that the free rider has good reason to end his or
her deceptive ways because failing to do so will bring much psychological and
emotional misery. In both cases, Plato appears, paradoxically, to appeal to the
agent’s own self-interest in order to persuade Thrasymachus that a moral life
is one informed by the Good and not by self-interest; one which, practically
speaking, is spent in service to others.
Plato, you will also recall, did not say too much more about the
Form of the Good (which illuminated the path to right conduct), except that
some people in society were able to glimpse it, even if only indirectly, bycritically
evaluating their own
moral beliefs and some were able to see it directly through their special
intellectual powers. Augustine saw a perfect fit between Plato’s concept of the
Good and the Christian God. Indeed, he believed Christian revelation, by
defining the Good in the concrete terms of a living, personal deity, completed
the work Plato had begun.
Like Plato, Augustine rejected Epicurean philosophy (see Part
III of the course), wherein happiness was conceived as entirely a matter of
physical pleasure, arguing it was not a matter of physical pleasure at all.
There were some differences between the two theorists, however. Plato held that
education and dialogue,elenchus, were the key to
inculcating a moral character and to conditioning people for living a good
life. As a Christian first and philosopher second, Augustine argued that
education and dialogue were not enough. One must aim for union with God in
order to develop moral character and wisdom sufficient for true happiness.
Augustine’s rationalism is illustrated by his rejection of
physical or sensual experience as being in any way relevant to knowledge of the
good or of God. With respect to his Platonic metaphysical views, the soul,
Augustine assumes, is an immaterial substance created by God and is, as we
infer from the excerpt from theEnchiridion, completely
good in itself. Augustine does not, in this selection, wade into the more
thorny aspects of metaphysical dualism (soul/body dualism), but succinctly
presents the options: Is man a soul or a body, or is he both of these. To
support his own theory of the good, he must assume that “man” is both, as did
Plato before him. As we will see in Part III of the course, there is another moral
tradition according to which morality is possible even if human beings are
‘body’ only—a concept that rationalists, such as Plato and Augustine, denied.
One of the key points to note in reading Augustine is how he attempts to take
Plato further, by providing a more determinate way of knowing the good and what
counts as good-in-itself.
Reading
Assignment
St. Augustine
1.
Read the St. Augustine selection
in the course text, including the editor’s introduction and the excerpts from Of the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Enchiridion, pages 112 to 118.
2.
Read the commentary on them in the Study
Guide.
Study Questions
1.
How does Augustine argue that the
“chief good of the soul” is following God?
2.
“For if my coachman, in obedience
to me, feeds and drives the horses he has charge of in the most satisfactory
manner, himself enjoying the more of my bounty in proportion to his good
conduct, can anyone deny that the good condition of the horses, as well as that
of the coachman, is due to me?” (see 115) What claim is Augustine making with
this rhetorical question? Do you agree with him?
3.
Augustine argues that a thing’s
being is entirely constituted by good, though not necessarily an incorruptible
good. Explain this argument in your own words and suggest ways in which
Augustine’s reasoning could be challenged.
4.
What does Augustine mean by the
word ‘soul’? Do you have one? If so, how would you describe it? If not, is this
significant?
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