Ethics Unit 1

Learning Objectives

When you have completed Unit 1, you should be able to

1.       describe the major positions held in the history of ethics (deontology, virtue ethics, utilitarianism).

2.       describe basic similarities and differences between these positions.

3.       define several key terms and describe some key distinctions used in ethical theory.

4.       conduct a preliminary ethical analysis of a primary source text.

Introduction

It perplexes many people that certain individuals—specifically ethicists and moral philosophers—study the subject of ethics and consider themselves “experts.” A lot of people, maybe most, believe that the values they express through their behaviour and judgement are subjective, a matter of personal choice, and that no one has the right to dictate how they ought to behave or what values they ought to hold. Further, many argue, since there is no consensus about values, like there is about the effects of gravity or the statutes of criminal law, there cannot really be a body of moral knowledge such that its mastery would constitute authority or expertise in the area of ethics. If there is no body of ethical knowledge; no authority on ethical issues, the skeptics argue, then there cannot be anything to study. If there’s nothing to study, they conclude, people who study ethics are wasting their time.

It would be taking you too far afield this early in the course to address all the problems with the above criticism of the study of ethics. To offer just a taste of one: suppose it is true that studying ethics is a waste of time for the reasons just mentioned. It would appear to follow then, that how anyone treats others should really be left up to individual discretion or the discretion of this or that group (this is called ‘ethical relativism’). Now suppose some person or group wants to kill all terrorists, and others want to kill anyone who tries to kill terrorists. By implication, from an ethical point of view, none of this would matter more than whether people prefer to spend their leisure time chasing hockey pucks or doing yoga. If you reject this implication of the “wasting their time” hypothesis, you must reject the hypothesis as well. To reject one and believe the other would be self-contradictory.

Some of you will nevertheless identify with the skeptic; others will see a variety of other weaknesses in the skeptic’s objections. To provide you with at least one more reason to go on, however, note how the skeptic in this case assumes science and the law represent settled bodies of knowledge: assumes there is widespread consensus concerning the claims made in both areas. We must accept this assumption if we are to accept the skeptic’s distinction between science and law on one hand, and ethics on the other. And we must accept that distinction if we are to accept the skeptic’s conclusion that studying ethics is a waste of time. But the starting assumption here is dubious.

There are many scientific and legal claims that do not enjoy anything like universal agreement. Take claims about the effects of carbon emissions on climate change, for example. There is disagreement among scientists as to whether reducing these emissions will slow the rate of global warming. With respect to the law, there is a great deal of controversy about whether video surveillance in public areas violates laws that protect personal privacy. When it comes to the certainty of their respective claims, the skeptic assumes a stark disanalogy between those of science and law and those of ethics: a disanalogy that may reasonably be called into question. As such, the rest of the skeptic’s argument—that ethics cannot be studied—need not be accepted.

“. . . ethics is rational inquiry into how to act and how to lead one’s life.”

We will proceed, then, with the alternative assumption that there is something to be studied when it comes to ethics and moral theory. Oliver Johnson and Andrews Reath, the authors of the introduction to the course text, proceed on the same assumption when they write, “. . . ethics is rational inquiry into how to act and how to lead one’s life.” (2012, 1). Some clarification on the use of the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ is in order here. In this course it will seem that the two terms are used interchangeably. Some writers prefer to use ‘morals’to refer to values and guidelines applied in particular contexts (cultures, professions, and so on) and ‘ethics’ to refer to the theories we appeal to in justifying them. Ethics is sometimes viewed as the theoretical examination of morality, and thus is equivalent to what some philosophers have called ‘moral philosophy’ or ‘theory of morals’. Distinguishing between the two terms on the basis of a difference between theory (ethics) and practice (morals) may be useful in some situations but, for the most part, the distinction will be noted as ‘ethical theory’ or ‘ethical practice’ and ‘moral theory’ or ‘moral practice.’

In the course of studying ethics, you will be reviewing three traditional theories of ethics and a number of variations on them. The three positions—deontology, virtue ethics, and utilitarianism—have withstood long periods of critical scrutiny and are regarded by ethicists and moral philosophers today as the principal contenders when it comes to ethical theory. But, you must be wondering, what is an ethical theory?

Typically, an ethical theory is a hypothesis that attempts to explain what makes good or right acts good or right. In the ancient and medieval traditions of moral philosophy, considerable emphasis was instead put on the development and maintenance of moral character—much more so than we find in modern theories. However, in the late twentieth century, the older moral themes, which are rooted in concepts of honour or virtue, attracted considerable attention, both positive and negative. While the primary emphasis in contemporary moral philosophy is still on the moral status of acts rather than on character, this course will treat the three approaches to ethics as equal. In the end, you will be faced with several options when judging their relative merits. You may find, despite certain problems associated with any one of the three theories presented, that it provides the best account of the way you make moral judgments. Alternatively, you may find that some combination of elements from two or all three theories fits best with the way you reason about ethical questions. Finally, you might reject the theories individually and in combination, favouring instead a theory not described here, or you may adopt the skeptic’s stance. The course will assist you in your journey to one or another of these results in a rational and informed manner. This introductory unit lays the groundwork for that project.

The term ‘honourable’ is a dedicated ethical term; it is not used for any purpose outside the domain of ethics. However, the term ‘good’ is often used to refer to non-ethical values, such as the way something tastes. The term ‘right’ is often used to describe a correct answer to an arithmetic problem. The terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ do not refer to goodness or rightness in either of those ways. We don’t say, “Mmmm. This spaghetti is really ethical.” Nor do we say: “Good job! You’ve answered the question, what does 2 + 2 equal, morally.” So, although the term ‘ethical’ means good or right, it is used in the context of our treatment of one another (or, possibly, non-human living beings and the environment). Even if, one might argue, you were the only person in the world, a bowl of spaghetti could taste good or bad, or your answer to a math question could be right or wrong. However, it is not so clear that, as the only being in the world, you could act ethically or unethically. The notions of good or right implied by the idea of ethics always involve the existence of beings with interests; beings who can be harmed in interactions with one another (or non-human living things). These notions also imply that there are ways of interacting with others we ought to pursue and others we ought to avoid.

In the case of such interactions, there is always the possibility that going about your business will affect the ability of others to go about theirs, and vice versa. If the effect is negative, it seems to raise the question among those so affected of whether the conduct at issue should be modified. If certain accounting practices result in widespread financial harm to investors, those investors are likely to call for changes to said practices. However, others argue that risk is an unavoidable aspect of investing. As soon as the question of whether a practice ought to be changed is raised, we are in ethical territory. Words like ‘should’, ‘ought’, and ‘must’ are ethical terms, as are their negations. Let us use the proverbial toilet seat debate as an example.

Western-style toilets have a hinged seat that can be raised against the back of the toilet or lowered to a sitting position. Leaving the seat up can result in cold surprises for females using the toilet in the dark—a negative effect, one could argue, of the household’s males going about their business. There should be a “seat down” rule for the males, the females might insist. But, as Edith Bunker, a character in the 1970s TV comedy All in the Family tells us, her husband Archie thinks putting the seat down is “women’s work.” Their son-in-law Michael’s view is, “seat up, seat down, what’s the difference?” The ethics of toilet seat positioning are being debated here. Toilet seat positioning affects the interests, in some cases negatively, of those who use the facilities.

Moral debate presupposes that some changes can be made in current conduct; there would be little point in debating changes if they were not possible. Some philosophers have argued that, since all conduct is determined by physical laws, there really is no choice or “free will” when it comes to deciding how to act. We will consider the debate between free will and determinism later in the course. For now, we will assume that, even if our conduct can be completely explained in terms of natural laws, we are capable of changing our behaviours. The problem is deciding what changes should be made and by whom. The males and the females engaged in the toilet seat debate could start a Toilet Seat War, toss a coin, or consult an authoritative or sacred text to resolve their conflict. But for various reasons, which we will be looking at in greater depth as the course proceeds, while certain disagreements may indeed call for one or another of these problem solving procedures, most ethical problems do not. Instead, they can be rationally analyzed and mitigated or resolved by appeal to ethical theory.

In the transition from theory to ‘first-order’ principle to applied principle, interpretation is required.

In much the same way that a theory about the colour of the sky is a proposition about what makes the sky blue, as noted above, an ethical theory is a proposition about what makes persons or acts right, honourable, or good. Once such a theory is proposed, one or more principles can be derived from it—principles that act as general guides to behaviour or judgements about behaviour. The principles can then be applied in specific contexts and situations. In the transition from theory to ‘first-order’ principle to applied principle, interpretation is required. Depending on the degree of interpretation, you may end up with a vague and often contested guide to behaviour or a clearly defined, widely recognized practical rule. Codes of ethics often contain such rules as well as somewhat more general guidelines. In this course, we are mainly concerned with theory and first-order principles and only marginally with applied principles and practical ethical or moral rules.^[1] As you will learn, there is significant disagreement among philosophers over which ethical theory is best and, even among those who agree on a theory, there is disagreement about which first order principles follow from it. But, as was noted against the skeptic’s objection to studying ethics, the fact that there is disagreement in a particular discipline is not a reason to regard it as empty of important and useful information or even of knowledge.

We now introduce deontology, virtue ethics, and utilitarianism. Theorists from each of these traditions propose different definitions of what constitutes right, honourable, or good individuals or acts. The consideration of each theory (or position) will begin in antiquity, move through its evolution during the medieval and modern eras, and conclude with its twentieth-century variants. Tracking each theory will expose you to criticisms of them and responses to those criticisms over time. As we proceed, the web of similarities and differences between the theories and their variants will become increasingly obvious and, not surprisingly, more complex.

Deontological Ethics

Acts done from the motive of duty are those where the actor is motivated by a rule of practical reason (e.g., Always tell the truth, Mind your own business) that can be applied universally; that is, in all similar cases without self-contradiction or exception.

When we express our approval or disapproval of someone’s conduct, we do not usually reflect on whether such expression is justified. Rather, we think we are entitled to express our opinions regardless of whether they have merit or worth. And indeed, under many constitutional regimes, we are so entitled. But, it is extremely important to understand that the entitlement to express one’s moral judgements and the legitimacy of such judgments are two very different things. We did not grant ourselves the entitlement of freedom of expression (codified in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) in order to recognize the legitimacy of our judgements. Rather, we did so in order to ensure that, in the midst of many unjustified and even false claims, moral judgements with merit and worth could be freely expressed. Ethical theories provide foundations for such judgements and may be appealed to in attempts to justify or legitimize them.

We begin our introductory survey with a look at deontology, or ethics based on duty. Deontologists focus the attention of morality on the concept of duty (the ancient Greek word deon means duty). There are three ways deontologists ethically classify acts:

Type 1. as acts done from the motive of duty,

Type 2. as acts done according to duty but from other motives, and

Type 3. as acts done contrary to duty.

According to deontology, an act has moral worth only when it is of Type 1; that is, done from the motive of duty regardless of consequences. In order to assess the moral worth of an act or judgement (e.g., the prohibition of abortion on demand), we need to reflect on the reasons we have for so acting or judging. Some deontologists insist such reasons apply universally or objectively. If someone’s reason for condemning abortion, for example, is the Bible’s sixth commandment, then “thou shalt not kill” must apply in all cases of killing. If we accept that the principle has exceptions, then according to some deontologists, we cannot use it to justify the view that abortion is morally unacceptable. You cannot have it both ways. Other deontologists note, however, the principles one uses may be more specific (e.g., killing in battle is allowable) than the very general “thou shalt not kill,” and may include conditions that would allow some killing but still make abortions morally unacceptable. Still others, sticking with general principles, argue these conditions may, at times, come into practical conflict with one another. You may not be able to “tell the truth” and “do no harm” at the same time, for example.^[2]

If you do not accept that religious reasons justify moral judgements, it may be because you think religious reasons are too open to interpretation. This sort of thinking is deontological. It presumes that particularity or dependence on changing circumstances (context sensitivity) is problematic when it comes to rendering moral judgements. The terms themselves—‘particular’, ‘universal’, and so on—underlie the study of metaphysics (what is real?) and epistemology (what is knowledge?). But we cannot completely separate questions of reality and knowledge from questions of ethics because so much of the language used in the first two areas will be used here. When it comes to making moral judgements about our conduct and the conduct of others, the reasoning we use, according to deontology, must be predictable: the same principle applies from person to person and from situation to situation. If, on Tuesday, your friend Chris expresses outrage at the destruction of South American rain forests by multinational commercial activity and on Thursday, expresses outrage at those who are peacefully trying to call international attention to this destruction, you might question Chris’s moral judgement. Those who take up the view that the basis of ethical reasoning must be fixed and universal would go further and claim your friend has not engaged in moral judgement at all. Some deontologists might even conclude that Chris is irrational.

It is possible that your friend was expressing a mood rather than a view about South American rain forests. On Tuesday, Chris was feeling socially responsible, on Thursday, impatient with unemployed youth. Perhaps next week, Chris will be in love and express moral neutrality on the rain forest question. Though not as variable as one’s moods, one’s religious commitments can also change over time. One of the points of a deontological or duty based approach to ethics is that our moods, our emotions, or our religious or other changeable commitments should not be trusted as arbiters of what is moral or immoral nor used to justify moral views.

This immediately raises the question of just what we ought to rely on for such judgements—deontologists argue: reason. According to most deontologists, reason is neither “outside” us, in the world, nor is it “inside,” in our bodies. Reason is the property of the mind that we understand as operating beyond the laws of nature. Reason is what enables us to recognize that “2 + 2 = 4” and that it can never be true that it is raining and not raining in the same place at the same time. We can certainly go wrong when applying reason (we can make an error in addition, for example, or contradict ourselves), but what reason requires is not determined by nature or by us: what reason requires never changes (2+2 must always equal 4, contradictions must always be impossible), so the deontologist argues.

Here we encounter one of the important ways that this position on moral theory has changed over the course of human history. Plato located the rational basis of morality outside of or external to us in what he called “the Forms.” However, the “outside” in which the Forms reside, according to Plato, is not in nature or the outside world as we typically know it. Rather, the Forms occupy a special place in the Cosmos—what some people would call ‘heaven’. Over time, this notion was abandoned, at least in its cruder versions, by most of those who followed Plato. Plato himself, it is suggested by some scholars, became less persuaded of the idea later in his life.

“We must tell the truth.” According to deontologists, this means that the ‘idea’ of truth telling itself has the power to rationally convince us to tell the truth.

The rightness of an act, according to this theory, therefore, is determined by the power of reason—power that can often come into conflict with the power of our passions or emotions, as well as with the power others (through our love or need for them) or our society has over us (in the form of legal rules, for example). Ethical or moral judgements often take the forms: ‘You should do this’, or ‘We must not do this’, or ‘I ought to have done that’. In an ethical context, deontological theorists insist that the terms ‘should’, ‘must’, and ‘ought’, as well as their negations, express our estimation of the rightness of a particular act or policy; that is, they express our estimation of the power that the idea of that act or policy has to rationally compel our behaviour. So, if we consider telling the truth, for example, we might say, “We must tell the truth.” According to deontologists, this means that the ‘idea’ of truth telling itself has the power to rationally convince us to tell the truth. We will explore this feature of deontological ethical theories in greater detail in the next few units. We will also consider an example of very early deontological ethics in the last part of this introductory unit.

Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics locates morality in personal character. What a person actually does in a particular situation is of less importance than the makeup of their character. The theory states that ethical persons are all those, and only those, with a virtuous disposition enabling them to make ethical choices no matter what the circumstances.

As we saw above, the focus of deontological ethics is on duty understood as the idea of a rationally compulsory act. If the idea of an act, say, telling the whole truth and nothing but the truth, is objective or universally applicable and, as such, rationally compelling, then the act itself is morally required. If we choose to remain silent or lie, then we have acted immorally. That is, we have chosen to act according to an idea that deontologists consider irrational; for example, “Remain silent or lie whenever it benefits you.” This idea is one promoted by an egoistic or self-interested approach to ethics. Problems with it will be examined throughout the course. According to deontologists, if we tell the truth in order to be well thought of by our fellow citizens, or because we may be legally punished if we do not, then, while our act is not immoral, it simply has no moral worth.

The solution to the problem of acting well under a variety of circumstances is to internalize the disposition to choose virtuously.

The theory of virtue ethics proposes instead that what matters most about human conduct is its honourableness. But the honourableness of an act cannot be understood apart from the honourableness of the actor. A virtuous or honourable (the terms will be used synonymously here) disposition compels a person to always choose the moderate over the excessive or deficient course of action. Individuals must be trained to be virtuous and avoid vice (the opposite of virtue) through habituation, reward, and punishment. Virtue ethics, therefore, takes seriously the ways situations involving ethical decisions can vary from one context to another and, on the basis of this consideration, insists there can be no sure-fire formula to tell us what to do every time we face an ethical decision. The solution to the problem of acting well under a variety of circumstances is to internalize the disposition to choose virtuously.

Success results in achieving the practical goal of human activity: a well-functioning society in which internal conflict and strife are eliminated, or at least reduced to a bare minimum.

While amenable to variations in circumstances, just what counts as choosing virtuously is not completely optional. When Aristotle, a student of Plato, first developed this theory, he gave clear limits to what constituted virtue and its opposite, vice (or dishonour). These limits are determined by what Aristotle considers the goal or purpose of human nature. Human beings are essentially social and rational creatures, Aristotle argues. That is, human beings are naturally endowed with the capacity to live in co-operation with one another and to realize the highest form of their co-operative essence, or eudaimonia (you dye monee a), through the collective use of human reason. Success results in achieving the practical goal of human activity: a well-functioning society in which internal conflict and strife are eliminated, or at least reduced to a bare minimum. Under these conditions, all citizens will achieve eudaimonia—roughly translated as complete intellectual, spiritual, and physical happiness. Virtuousness in general, Aristotle claims, is the disposition to act in ways that promote or protect the integrity of society which is, in turn, a necessary condition of the individual achievement of eudaimonia. Courage, loyalty, honesty, temperance, and generosity are among the dispositions he identifies as required. Envy, dishonesty, cowardice, pettiness, and boastfulness are among the dispositions he calls vices. The virtues enable individuals to co-operate successfully with one another, but where individuals are characterized by the vices, the sort of long-term co-operation presupposed by a well-functioning society is impossible.

Virtue ethics as an ethical theory was the subject of a great deal of criticism after the sixteenth century but, after a long dormant period, once again enjoys a significant following among ethicists and moral philosophers. We will take a more detailed look at the theory in Part II of the course. It will suffice here to mention one of the concerns raised against it, a concern which, even at this early point, some of you may have. The concern is with the above mentioned limits to what constitutes a virtuous character. Aristotle proposed that to count as virtuous, a person’s disposition has to tend, among other things, towards the promotion and protection of a well-functioning society. For many modern critics of virtue ethics, Aristotle’s approach is flawed by its failure to account for the interests of individuals because he placed primary ethical importance on the social group. As long as the interests of individuals and the group coincide, this approach might not run into too many problems. Aristotle realized this, of course, and argued that individuals could and therefore ought to be educated to develop those traditional virtues which conduced to the interests of the group. But, should their interests diverge from those of the group, Aristotle’s position seems to leave no room for doubt: the interests of the individual must be sacrificed for the good of the group. In the case of certain groups of individuals who had no political voice (women, children, slaves of both sexes and all ages), routinely denying or ignoring their interests was of little account to most Athenian citizens because only free men could be citizens.

As we will see, modern virtue ethicists have responded to this criticism and others through various amendments to Aristotle’s original theory. It will be up to you to judge just how far those amendments go toward correcting the problems identified by critics.

Utilitarian Ethics

Utilitarianism regards the consideration of the consequences of our acts as the only important issue when it comes to our ethical reasoning. We ought, the utilitarian asserts, to promote the greatest happiness or pleasure for the greatest number of all those affected by our decisions and actions.

Deontologists argue that what is ethically important is the principle behind what someone does. Some people say that, if you are a person who always stands on principle, then you are a deontologist. We will not, in Philosophy 350, follow this practice because the conception of ‘principle’ that deontology presupposes is too narrow for our purposes. For deontologists, ethical principles are only those precepts that are universalizable. But not all ethical theories adopt this strict standard. Virtue ethicists argue that it is the character of the actor that demands our ethical attention. The actor must be virtuous. Both theories might well support the principle that tells us we ought not to tell lies. The idea of lying, according to a deontologist, is always irrational, so, always unethical. The dishonest person, according to a virtue ethicist, is unethical insofar as dishonesty is part of his or her character. But it may not be unethical to lie in certain kinds of situations according to this theory. While neither theory completely neglects actual behaviour as relevant to moral judgement, actual acts and their consequences take a back seat to other considerations in both cases.

The third group of theories we will look at are the consequentialist theories, specifically utilitarianism. Utilitarian ethical theory, unlike deontology, is very much focused on what is happening in the world—both the internal world of human emotion and the external world of human action. Utilitarians do not generally regard reason as independent of other compelling factors in determining our wills. As we saw earlier, deontologists argue that relying on these other influences on the will cannot serve the interest of morality because they are so variable. But utilitarians respond by insisting that, while changeable to some extent, the basics of what makes a human being happy have not varied much over time or significantly from culture to culture. Human beings have, according to those who think along utilitarian lines, many more similarities and fewer differences than deontologists would have us believe. Especially when we consider groups of human beings who share cultural backgrounds, we find a great deal of convergence. Happiness, therefore, is not the unstable foundation for ethical judgement that deontologists think it is, or so utilitarians argue.

Like virtue ethics, utilitarianism takes as given that the ultimate reason anyone does anything is to be happy or experience pleasure. Also, like virtue ethicists, utilitarians understand happiness as an emotion that involves our feelings about the happiness of others. And so some utilitarians, but by no means all, insist that no individual can be morally happy unless he or she is doing everything in his or her power, all things considered, to improve the lot of others. We will explore the difficulties that have arisen for utilitarians over this claim and others when we look in detail at this type of moral theory in Part III of the course. While utilitarianism may be looking a lot like virtue ethics right now, there are a couple of crucial differences.

According to virtue ethics, no individual can achieve moral happiness, or eudaimonia, on his or her own. This is why the group rather than the individual has moral sovereignty under virtue ethics. But according to utilitarianism, what enables an individual to experience happiness is ultimately his or her ability to feel pleasure and pain. These abilities are possessed by human beings on their own as well as in groups. As such, according to most utilitarians, even a human being who is detached (either by choice or by exclusion) from society can experience moral happiness. Connected to this difference is another one that has serious political implications. Traditionally, virtue ethicists like Aristotle base their concepts of what counts as a morally considerable being on a definition of personhood in which many people, for instance all women, are excluded. Making ethical public policy requires consulting the privileged few rather than the masses. Under utilitarianism, the definition of a morally considerable being includes even non-human animals. In making public policy, utilitarians argue, everyone whose interests are involved, who can be consulted directly or through representation, must be.

One critical development in the evolution of utilitarian ethical theory was a distinction, introduced in the early twentieth century, between what are now called “rule” utilitarianism and “act” utilitarianism. In the case of rule utilitarianism, the principle of utility—which states that one ought to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number concerned—is applied to the rules that guide our conduct, rather than to our individual acts. Rule utilitarianism starts to look a little like deontology. And while there are some important differences—we will look at them in Unit 10—the similarities have disturbed some traditional utilitarians, who insist on endorsing what they consider true utilitarianism and what is now called act utilitarianism. According to act utilitarianism, the principle of utility applies to individual acts only.

Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are the principal figures in the development of utilitarian ethical theory. Indeed, Bentham is considered its progenitor. There have been many criticisms of the theory. In particular, utilitarianism, because it conflates happiness and pleasure, is condemned by many for reducing the moral worth of human beings to that on a par with non-human animals. One of the pieces we will read was written by Mill in defence of the theory against this and other criticisms in the mid-nineteenth century. While this particular criticism waned during the twentieth century, worries emerged that net balances of happiness could not be accurately calculated and that the theory seemed to require a willingness to violate human rights. Contemporary utilitarians have responded to these challenges and the theory stubbornly remains a serious rival of deontological ethics and virtue ethics.

Alternative Paths

Throughout the history of ethical theorizing, alongside the main contenders, many philosophers have proposed alternative approaches to ethical reasoning. As noted above, some ethical theorists and moral philosophers have attempted to synthesize elements from two or more of the theories in efforts to reconcile them and simplify moral theorizing. This type of intellectual project is not unlike the one in physics which seeks a grand unified theory of the four seemingly disparate forces operating in the universe (gravity, electromagnetic, and the strong and weak nuclear forces). There have also been, and continue to be, thinkers who adopt an extreme skeptical stance to moral claims. Such skepticism does not always imply complete rejection of ethics as a teachable subject, however. As you will see in the last unit of the course, ethical claims are in any case susceptible to linguistic analysis, in which philosophers take great interest. Finally, while the focus here is on the Greco-European tradition, Native and Asian approaches to morality have connections and differences well worth exploring.^[3]

Some Important Terminology

Universalizability refers to the logical property of a reason, principle, or rule that enables its application in all like cases without contradiction or exception; that is, it can be made universal.

Some important ethical terms have already been introduced; for example, ‘universalizability.’ Universalizability refers to the logical property of a reason, principle, or rule that enables its application in all like cases without contradiction or exception; that is, it can be made universal. We sometimes use the term ‘objective’ to refer to this property of an ethical proposition. If you justify lying about having taken the last cookie from the cookie jar by appealing to your interest in avoiding punishment, then interest in avoiding punishment should always be acceptable as a reason for lying about one’s conduct. Deontologists doubt that rational persons would accept this justification for lying. The whole point of lying is, on this sort of analysis, to produce some benefit from the fact that you will be believed. However, if everyone were justified in lying to escape punishment, no one would ever believe anything they were told. And if we never believed one another, lying would be of no benefit whatsoever to anyone. If there were no such benefit, it would be irrational (and stupid) to lie in order to escape punishment—a sure sign, according to deontologists, that lying is immoral! In contrast to the requirement for universalizability, other theorists, utilitarians for example, allow that the morality of conduct is particular—that is, dependent on circumstances. A utilitarian could argue that because lying in one case might very well promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but not in another, the morality of lying is particular, not universal.

The terms ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ have also been introduced. A virtue is a disposition to act well. Acting well always refers to acting in ways that promote the integration or cohesiveness of one’s social group, ultimately leading to one’s eudaimonia (moral happiness). As we will see, Aristotle defined virtue as moderation in action. A vice is a disposition to act in a way that puts group integrity or social cohesiveness at risk and is defined (in contrast to moderation) by excessiveness or deficiency. So, one might argue that generosity is a virtue—miserliness and profligacy vices. Virtues and vices are settled aspects of character. A normally generous person would not be described as miserly, for example, simply on the basis of one act of not sharing. Nor, according to virtue ethics, would a normally cowardly person be described as courageous on the basis of one brave act.

Another term that has been introduced is ‘consequences.’ As we have seen, utilitarians focus almost exclusively on the consequences of a behaviour as indicators of its moral acceptability and worth. In contrast, deontologists focus on intentions (the idea of an act) or what are often called maxims. The consequences of lying might include avoiding punishment for the liar or saving the innocent as well as misdirecting others and, if caught in a lie, reducing or destroying trust. Many deontologists argue the consideration of consequences is largely irrelevant to the morality of our actions because they consider it common sense that, for example, immoral acts (such as lying) often have positive consequences. Rather, what is important is the intention—that is the idea behind an action. If our intention is to “create false impressions to escape punishment,” the deontologist asks whether this intention can ever be universalized or applied without exception or contradiction and, as we have seen, answers “no.” As such, deontologists and utilitarians often disagree about the morality of various behaviours.

A concept or value is fundamental (or intrinsic) whenever it is used to explain all other concepts or justify all other values and is never itself explained or justified with reference to some other concept or value.

As we have noted, the term ‘deontological’ itself is based in the concept of duty or obligation, from the ancient Greek word deon, meaning duty. Deontologists believe the concept of duty is fundamental rather thaninstrumental. These two terms mark out an additional important distinction in ethics. A concept or value is fundamental (or intrinsic) whenever it is used to explain all other concepts or justify all other values and is never itself explained or justified with reference to some other concept or value. On the other hand, a concept or value is instrumental (or extrinsic) whenever it is explained or justified by reference to some other concept or value. Unlike deontologists, utilitarians and virtue ethicists believe the concept or value of duty is instrumental. Utilitarians believe it is instrumental because they see the value we place on fulfilling our duties in the promotion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. If fulfilling a duty produced more misery than happiness, a utilitarian would regard fulfilling it as immoral. A virtue ethicist believes the virtue of dutifulness is instrumental to the preservation of a cohesive society and eudaimonia. If fulfilling a duty does not have this result, a virtue ethicist would not regard it as moral to do so. Since both utilitarianism and virtue ethics focus on the effects of either character or behaviour—that is, they are forward looking—they are referred to, in contrast to deontological theories, as teleological theories. Teleological ethical theories are ones that locate the ultimate determination of what is right, honourable, or good in its overall effects, either in the world generally or, specifically, on the formation of character.

Since both utilitarianism and virtue ethics focus on the effects of either character or behaviour—that is, they are forward looking—they are referred to, in contrast to deontological theories, as teleological theories.

Many students find it difficult to grasp a further and crucial distinction in ethics. The reason for the difficulty lies in certain habits of language. In everyday conversation, you might hear someone comment: “In our family, everyone respects their elders.” Some moral judgements or ethical norms are typically veiled by or concealed in such reports. For example, this one may be code for “you ought to respect the family elders if you become a member of this family,” or “our family does the right thing when it upholds the value of respect for one’s elders.” While the statement may be intended to convey the second sort of ethical claim in the guise of a simple report, it is important to realize that, logically, the report does not in any way contain or imply the ethical norm. Ethicists call the first sort of claim or report—for example, that “we respect our elders”—a descriptive claim (what is) and the second sort of claim—that “we ought to or must respect our elders”—a normative (or prescriptive) claim (what ought to be). Normative claims say something quite different than do descriptive claims. Descriptive claims simply report on a particular fact or phenomenon—they are the sorts of claims made by sociologists, for example. “We respect our elders” is a descriptive claim; it tells others what we happen to do. But nothing about what we happen to do informs us or others about what we ought to do.

Here is another example of a descriptive claim: “Human beings kill one another for pleasure.” This claim shows very clearly that nothing normative or prescriptive—that is, nothing about how we ought to behave or what sort of behaviour is good or right—follows from what we happen to do. For that, one must appeal to a moral or ethical theory or principle. So, going back to the elders example, you might argue as follows: We respect our elders because doing so produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number concerned. Weought to produce the greatest happiness for the greatestnumber concerned. Therefore, we ought to respect our elders.

These are some of the more important terms and distinctions used by moral philosophers in the study of ethics. As we proceed through the course, they will be encountered again and again. Do not worry if you feel somewhat uncertain about their meanings. Gaining confidence and facility with abstract philosophical ideas is a matter of reading carefully and critically, reflecting through the use if inner dialogue and discussion—never simple memorization.

Review Questions

Before you go further in this unit, review what you have learned so far.

1.       What are the main ethical principles of deontology, virtue ethics, and utilitarianism, respectively?

2.       Define the following distinctions as they are used in ethical theorizing: universal versusparticular, virtue versus vice, consequences versus intentions, fundamental (intrinsic) versusinstrumental, normative versus descriptive, and deontological versus teleological.

Reading Assignment

1.       The selection from the Euthyphro, pages 16 to 28 in the course textbook, Ethics: Selections from Classical and Contemporary Writers.

2.       The Commentary on Plato’s Euthyphro in this Study Guide.

When reading the assigned texts, keep in mind that you are expected to read them more than once. Reading the assigned text at least once before reading this guide’s commentary will establish an initial impression of what the text is about. After reading the guide and re-reading the text, you will be able to do a number of things, among which include developing a more complete interpretation of the text, and a clearer understanding of where the ideas may fall short or be criticisable. When references or direct quotes to the text are made in this guide, citations may not be given. You cannot do this in your papers, so some explanation is owed. The reason for using this approach is to encourage you to know the text in detail, so that you can corroborate references to the text, as they are often made in face-to-face lectures. When good lecturers use this approach, they create a three-way relationship between the text, the lecturer and the audience. In this relationship, a critical awareness is formed between the lecturer and audience, where the audience can witness how the lecturer is using passages in the text to formulate an interpretation. This, in turn, provides a focus and point of reference for members of the audience to criticize the lecturer, just in case they disagree with how he or she is interpreting the text. We could consider this relationship an interpretation community. For this reason, after reading the guide, it would be useful to mark the passages in the text to which the guide refers. This way of reading helps to solidify your understanding of the text, by helping you attend more closely to key passages which you will use to interpret the text.

Recommended

1.       “An Introduction to the Study of Ethics,” pages 1 to 12 in the text. It will reinforce the ideas and concepts that have been discussed so far.

2.       The text editor’s introduction to Part I, “The Classical and Medieval Periods,” pages 13 to 15. This will give you some background to the historical period we will discuss next.

3.       If you are interested in how Socrates defended himself before his judges, consider reading Plato’s dialogue The Apology, in which the trial is recounted.^[4]

Commentary on Plato’s Euthyphro

Plato composed virtually all of his writings in dialogue form.^[5] He used this form to demonstrate the method that his teacher, Socrates, used to encourage people to question their beliefs. Socrates reasoned that people, if they question their existing beliefs with sufficient rigour, will either learn that their beliefs are justified by reason, or be led to other beliefs that could be. Many of the beliefs we grow up with, perhaps most, are acquired by other means; for example, through the influence of parents and teachers, by coercion or culture, through the evidence of our senses, or by propaganda. These sources, Socrates argues, cannot be relied on to direct us toward the truth, even though they often point to it. As our reason matures, Socrates insists, we can and must use it to assess our beliefs and decide whether they need to be altered. He may have been the first human to suggest that individual reason is capable of policing itself. Yet, you might well ask whether Socrates, in insisting on this method of rational questioning, is simply imposing one equally reliable or unreliable view about how beliefs are justified in place of others. This is a good question, not easily answered. However, Socrates did believe that a person’s beliefs were something he or she should be able to defend as his or her own. Beliefs which one held as a result of external influences are not “owned” in this way. This does not mean that a process of rational criticism will always result in the rejection of beliefs we initially acquire in other ways. It does mean that once a belief survived this sort of analysis, it becomes, according to Socrates, one’s own in the required sense.

In the excerpt you have just read, Socrates meets Euthyphro outside the Athens courthouse where they are waiting their turns before the judges. Euthyphro is there to charge his father with the murder of his servant. Socrates is there to respond to a charge of corrupting the youth of Athens by encouraging them to be impious—to question their beliefs in the gods. Euthyphro is well known to Socrates as one of the pre-eminent Sophists of the time. Sophists were public teachers of and speakers on morality, understood in the practical sense.^[6] Here is one case where the distinction mentioned earlier between ethics (theory) and morality (practice) is relevant. Socrates aims, in this dialogue, to lead Euthyphro from considerations of practice to considerations of theory. In doing so, Socrates gets Euthyphro to ask himself questions about his beliefs that he was not in the habit of asking.

Socrates’ conclusion that piety comes first and the gods loving pious things comes second implies, as was noted above, that whatever piety consists in, it does so independently of what the gods find pleasing. This implies that even if there were no gods, there could be piety. Does Socrates think piety could exist even if there were no people? We are not given enough information in the Euthyphro dialogue to answer this question. However, in Plato’s other writings, it is alleged this is what Socrates believed. If we understand by piety some notion of moral goodness in persons or moral rightness of actions, it follows from Socrates’ and Plato’s view that the standard involved is not based on anything “in the world.” This is because the standard exists whether or not there is anything to which it applies. As we noted earlier, Socrates and Plato believed the source of such standards (there were others) was in what some might call heaven. Plato’s Theory of the Formswill be explored in greater detail in the next unit.

When Socrates walked the streets of Athens, philosophers had not yet made the clear the theoretical distinctions presented earlier in this unit. Socrates often discussed the importance of virtues and living a virtuous life. Piety, according to Socrates, was one such virtue. But both Socrates and Plato believed that what defined the virtues—what determined what was virtuous and what was not—could not be judged by reference to human nature and experience. Rather, what constituted virtue must be discovered by pure reason. As such, if forced to classify Socrates’ ethics as deontological, virtue ethics, or utilitarianism, a good argument could be made for choosing deontology.

Euthyphro Study Questions with Demonstration Answers

The answers given here are not the only right answers to these study questions on Euthyphro. Rather, they are intended to model what is expected of students when answering the Study Questions in other units. Try to answer the question on your own first. If your answers differ significantly, discuss the differences with your tutor.

SQ1. In your own words, what is the issue about which Socrates and Euthyphro are in disagreement? [Show Model Answer]

SQ2. What are Euthyphro’s definitions of “piety,” and Socrates’ objections to each? [Show Model Answer]

Conclusion

We have begun our exploration of ethical theory with Socrates’ troubling question about the relationship between religion and morality. Is religious authority sufficient to determine what is moral and what is immoral? Socrates argues that the view that it is sufficient is illogical. Instead, he concludes, the essence of morality must be discoverable by individual reason; reason alone is sufficient for finding the difference between right and wrong, honour and dishonour, good and bad. Rational, not religious or political authority, or even the authority of experience, is ethically ultimate.

In the next unit, this position will be explored further when we examine excerpts from Plato’s Republic.