Ethics Unit 3
·
Immanuel Kant - Introduction
Introduction
It is a long stretch from St. Augustine in the fourth century to
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in the eighteenth. During the long, intervening
period, European moral philosophy remained the monopoly of religion. After the
spread of Christianity throughout Europe, and later the Americas, theorizing
about morality came to be dominated by church authorities and theologians. In
effect, morality became a matter of theological, rather than philosophical,
debate. Medieval and early modern philosophy was instead dominated by
discussion of metaphysics (theories of reality) and epistemology (theories of
knowledge). René Descartes, for example, known as the father of modern
philosophy, speaking of Princess Christina of Sweden in 1646, wrote a friend,
Had I dealt with moral philosophy, then perhaps I would have
reason to hope that she might find my writings more agreeable; but this is a
subject which I must not get involved in writing about. The Regents are so
worked up against me because of the harmless principles of physics they have
seen . . . that if I dealt with morality after all that, they would never give
me any peace.”[19]
Descartes knew that attempts to question the rules of morality,
as they were held by the church, could get one into serious trouble, even jail.
But there were those who nevertheless pursued such topics. Some,
like the British thinker Thomas Hobbes, a contemporary of Descartes, rejected
the metaphysical basis of Plato’s moral philosophy—that its basis was in the Form
of the Good. We will look at Hobbes and his philosophical treatment of the
question of morality later in the course when we consider the “ethics of
pleasure and pain” approach. Much more common throughout this and other
historical periods was writing on everyday morality, etiquette, and so on,
whose authors, by carefully avoiding all deep or vexing questions of ethics,
did not want to attract the scrutiny of the church.
There were also moral
sense theorists, like
Joseph Butler and David Hume (whose work we will look at in Part II). They
argue that neither the “right and wrong” approach nor the “pleasure and pain”
approach to ethics is entirely satisfactory. Each leaves out a big, though
different, part of the morality picture—moral motivation. Recall Socrates’
argument wherein the unjust man who exploited a reputation for honesty would
find his soul in conflict with itself. Even if plausible, such predictions are
rarely sufficient to motivate the successful con artist to go straight.
Plato’s proposed solution to the moral motivation problem—the
problem which arises when someone askswhy they should be moral—rests on the
assumption that the only sort of person who would ask such a question is one
who is completely self-absorbed. Granting this assumption, Plato offers an
answer that appeals to self-interest; that is, as a psychological egoist you
should be moral because, in the long run, being moral or just will make you
happier or more successful than you would be otherwise. But answering this
question at all grants something that Plato is unwilling to grant more
generally: that human beings are psychological egoists unmoved by reasons that
prioritize the interests of others or by reason itself.
This brief account of some of the developments in ethics between
St. Augustine’s time and that of Kant illustrates the centrality of the moral
motivation debate to the history of moral philosophy. A few things about it
need to be said before we proceed. First, the term refers to the internal causes of moral conduct or conduct believed
to be moral or ethical. So, when philosophers talk about moral motivation, they
may mean any of several things. They may mean an emotional disposition, such as
a kind nature, or an emotional event, such as a burst of righteous indignation,
or the sense of duty that, it is argued, compels an otherwise reluctant soldier
to walk unhesitatingly into battle. In the post-Freudian world, moral
motivation may refer to something in the unconscious: a directive from the
super-ego, for example. More generally, it may refer to either egoism or
altruism, that is, to something about human nature. Moral motivation may refer
to the purpose of action. For example, if I want to do my part to alleviate
world hunger, I may make a charitable donation to a hunger relief organization.
My donating is caused by my desire that world hunger be alleviated (together
with my belief that giving money to this organization will help do that).
Alternatively, my motive for acting morally may be independent
of the purpose of my action. As John Stuart Mill wrote in the nineteenth
century,
the motive has nothing to do with morality of the action, though
much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning
does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being
paid for his trouble.[20]
Jumping in the water (action) is the act that brings about the
desired result: saving the drowning person (purpose). But this purpose is
independent of motive, a sense of duty or desire to make some money (motive),
in the sense that no one particular motive necessarily caused the behaviour.
German Transcendentalist and Father of Modern
Moral Philosophy
Rationalists like Plato and Immanuel Kant tend to argue that your emotional
or psychological state does not enter into the determination of genuine moral
reasoning and moral action.
Rationalists like Plato and Immanuel Kant tend to argue that your emotional
or psychological state does not enter into the determination of genuine moral
reasoning and moral action. Moral sense theorists like Butler and Hume tend to
argue that feelings are important and function intuitively to constitute moral
judgement and prompt moral action. Empiricists like Mill, as we will see later, adopt
a descriptive model of moral reasoning closer to that of the moral sense
theorists than the rationalists. However, normatively (what one ought to do),
all moral weight is placed on the promotion of happiness understood as an
empirical matter rather than an intuitive one, contrary to the moral sense
theorists. These similarities and differences between the three theories will
become clearer as the course proceeds, so do not worry if you are having
trouble keeping them straight at this point.
There are two things to keep in mind as you begin your study of
Kant’s ethics. First, Kant was responding to three distinct traditions in moral
thought: the religious tradition (both Roman Catholic and post-Reformation Protestant);
the modern psychological egoism tradition found in Thomas Hobbes (expressed
much earlier by Thrasymachus in the Republic);
and finally, the moral sense tradition found in Butler and Hume, which we will
look at more closely later on. Second, Kant was a rationalist about moral
motivation. If one had to ask, “why be moral,” Kant thought, like Plato, that
you might be capable of acting morally; that is, in a way a moral
person would act, but you were not capable of being moral; that is, you lacked the
intellectual resources necessary to understand and accept the requirements of
morality. Anyone who possessed those requirements would never think to ask: why
be moral?
Learning
Objectives
When you have completed Unit 3, you should be able to
1.
describe and explain Kant’s
conception of a good will.
2.
Outline Kant’s distinction between
hypothetical and categorical imperatives, his analysis of the Categorical
Imperative, and his concept of the Realm of Ends.
3.
classify Kant according to the
distinctions presented in Unit 1.
4.
assess the strengths and
weaknesses in his position.
Reading
Assignment
1.
Read the Commentary in this Study
Guide on Kant’s Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals.
2.
Turn to the textbook and read the
editor’s introduction (181 to 183)
3.
Read Kant’s “First Section:
Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to the Philosophical”
(184 to 191).
4.
Re-read the “First Section.”
Foundations of
the Metaphysics of Morals
The Kant selection in your course text comes from his work Foundations of
the Metaphysics of Morals—quite a mouthful. Kant wrote the Foundation, or Groundwork as it is sometimes called, as a
preface to hisMetaphysics of Morals, where he analyzes the philosophical
basis of what he conceived as the moral law. The selection is divided into two
sections.
You will notice Kant’s writing style, even in contemporary
English translation, makes reading comprehension difficult. Take your time;
reading out loud often helps. Contact your tutor if you need clarification.
Study Questions
Before proceeding to the commentary, some questions need to be
addressed.
1.
In the “First Section” of the Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins to explore the concept of
a good will in terms that he assumes his average reader will understand. What
is Kant assuming about morality when he begins his study this way?
2.
How might his concept of the good
will relate to Socrates’ discussions with his conversation partners in the Republic and St. Augustine’s commentary in Of the
Morals of the Catholic Church?
Commentary
Between the time of Augustine and that of Kant, a great deal had
been written about what made humans tick. As was noted, the issue of moral
motivation was a central theme in moral theory. But another question, which
remained unsettled even in Kant’s day, was whether there was such a thing as a
human soul. In Plato’s time, the term soul was used to refer to what we today
think of as the mind in addition to being used to refer to what we consider the
spiritual soul. The distinctions made today, and generally since the eighteenth
century, between the brain, the mind, and the soul, were not typically made in
Plato’s time. As the distinctions came into more general use, ‘soul’ became
more and more restricted to theological and religious contexts where the soul
was accepted as an immaterial or spiritual substance that survived the death of
the body. Philosophers of metaphysics also maintained interest in critically
examining the concept of the soul understood in this spiritual sense. However,
moral philosophers, especially in the modern period, shifted to the use of will and emotion when discussing the aspect of human
being that they regarded as functionally dedicated to moral conduct.
Kant’s use of the term ‘will’ may be understood against this
historical background. In the first part of the “First Section,” Kant
introduces two points of importance. The first is whatever the good will is,
only a good will, among all human faculties (capacities), can be considered
“good without qualification.” (184) The second is that the fact that nature has
appointed reason “the ruler of our will” (185) proves that its proper function
is the production of a good will and not the insurance of our survival and
comfort. In both cases, Kant presents arguments in support of these claims that
distinguish his views from mere opinions.
Thus far in the course, we have talked about particular
arguments, but said very little about what an argument as such is, or how to go
about constructing a good one. Since the study of philosophy is, in terms of
its methodology, the study of arguments (just as biology is the study of living
tissue or sociology is the study of human groups), we need to take a moment to
focus on this subject.[21] In order to do so, we will reconstruct
Kant’s argument for the first main point in the “First Section.”
The “Good Will”
Argument
Philosophical arguments are chains of claims serving as reasons
for accepting a conclusion. Philosophical arguments, like advertising,
rhetoric, propaganda, and the use of violent threats, are intended to persuade
people to believe or do some things rather than others. The particular method
of persuasion in the case of philosophical arguments is the use of empirical
evidence and logic, or reason.
Notice how Kant argues that “nothing . . . can possibly be
conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will.” When
reconstructing a philosophical argument, one ought always to begin by identifying
the author’s conclusion or main ‘therefore’ point. In this case:
Therefore (implied), nothing is good without qualification
except a good will.
Sometimes conclusions are simple to identify; sometimes
difficult. Ask yourself what the author’s main point seems to be. If you were
the editor of a newspaper, what statement of the speaker would you choose to
put in the headline? Work on reconstructing the argument from there. Next, go
through the material preceding, following, or surrounding the conclusion or
main point and summarize what you think are the most important points the
author presents in support of it: Here is a rendition of part of Kant’s
argument in support of his first point (in the “First Section”):
1.
Characteristics besides a good
will may be desirable “but they can become extremely bad and harmful . . . if
the will is not good.”
2.
“It is the same with gifts of
fortune.”
3.
Other qualities “facilitate” a
good will, and so presuppose it.
4.
Therefore, none of these things are good without qualification.
We have not yet arrived at the conclusion we originally
identified. To get there, Kant must present support for the claim that a good
will, unlike these other things, is good without
qualification:
5.
Regardless of whether it is useful
or useless, powerful or powerless, a good will is not in any way less valued.
6.
Therefore, a good will is good
without qualification.
7.
Therefore, nothing is good without
qualification except a good will.
Kant appears to have provided considerable support for his
conclusion, but appearances can be deceiving. You will be asked whether he has
provided adequate support for it later on in the unit.
The Good Will and
Duty
Kant examines the concept of duty as a means of working out the
details of his concept of a good will. He does not fully explain why he uses
the concept of duty for this purpose except to say “it contains the concept of
a good will.” His aim is to list “propositions of morality”; that is, what he
thinks morality requires:
1.
“to have moral worth an action
must be done from duty.”
2.
“an action done from duty does not
have its moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in
the maxim by which it is determined.”
3.
“duty is the necessity of an
action done from respect for the law.” (When Kant uses the term ‘law’ here, he
does not mean the law as it is found, for example, in government statutes or
criminal codes. He means the ‘moral’ law—something that exists necessarily
within the mind of each rational person.)
By way of empirical support for these points, Kant presents
several everyday examples of the sort of moral difficulties he expects most
readers will recognize and makes several factual claims concerning them. For
example, Kant writes, “there are, moreover, many persons so sympathetically
constituted that without any motive of vanity or selfishness they find an inner
satisfaction on spreading joy and rejoice in the contentment of others which
they have made possible.” (187) This is an empirical or descriptive claim, or
one that purports to be a fact about the world as it happens to be. On its own,
however, this empirical claim will not adequately support the claim that Kant
wants to make about morality. He observes such persons are motivated by their
desire to do good for others. What if someone lacked this sort of motivation?
What if they did not care much about others nor about their reputations but
nevertheless acted in charitable ways towards those who needed help? Would we
want to claim they were acting immorally? On the contrary, says Kant, arguing
that such persons alone are known to act from duty. Actions done from other
motives, including motives of generosity or benevolence, lack moral worth since
such motives are not reliable guarantees of what constitutes moral conduct.
Understanding one’s duty, however, is a reliable guarantee of what one ought to
do.
There are two combinations of desire and duty. One is when your
desire (to tell the truth, for example) coincides with your duty (in this case,
to be honest). The second is when your desire to act (to lie, for example)
conflicts with your duty (again, in this case, to be honest). According to
Kant, your action can only be known to have moral worth if, first, it coincides
with duty and, second, conflicts with desire. For it is only when doing your
duty conflicts with what you want to do that you can know you have truly acted from duty and not from some other motive
(merely in accordance with duty). Kant’s argument assumes, at this point, that
acting from duty is the mark of a good will: a will that is good “without
qualification.” Kant’s proposition may seem counterintuitive. It implies that,
when someone gets pleasure from donating huge amounts of money to charity for
example—even when their donations impoverish them—their actions have no moral
worth. It doesnot follow
from Kant’s argument that such acts are immoral, however. He thinks they have
prudential value (value for the individual) and bring happiness to others.
However neither of these results is good in itself, as he argued in the opening
of the reading.
With the second proposition: “an action done from duty does not
have its moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in
the maxim by which it is determined,” Kant makes his anti-consequentialism
clear. As we noted in Unit 1, ‘consequentialism’is another sort of moral
theory—one developed mainly after Kant had developed his moral theory.
Nevertheless, the idea behind consequentialism—that what matters to morality is
how things turn out—has been around as long as the opposing idea—that morality
is a matter of what one intends, not what happens. It is thus easy enough to
see what Kant means when he argues that the moral worth of an act does not lie
in whether or not that act is successful in achieving its object or purpose
(morality is not about consequences). But what does he mean when he says it
lies in the “maxim by which it is determined”?
This point will come up again in the “Second Section” of Foundations. For now, it is
enough to say that Kant assumes all rational people, when they are acting
rationally, determine their actions by reason, not impulse. So, let’s say you
have accidentally taken an important device home from work because you left it
in your pocket, and your boss asks you the next day if you know anything about
its disappearance. (Unbeknownst to your boss, you have put it back in its
place.) Let’s further suppose that you could get a severe reprimand, or be
fired, for taking the item. This consequence, if you have dependants, would be
harmful and contribute to your likely failure as a parent. What could it mean
to decide rationally in this case, rather than on impulse? What if you lied and
waited until he got back to see that the device was there, hoping that he would
second guess himself, and it turned out that he did. You could stare blankly
into space, pretending that you are under so much stress that one more bit of
stress would push you off the deep end. In both cases, can you not claim that
your decision was rational? After all, both are calculated responses that
employed your reasoning capacities. Or, you might take a chance and tell the
truth. What would Kant say about these possible responses in terms of their
rationality? Keep in mind that Kant thinks a rational person’s response falls
under a rule that persons generally live by. Possible rules are: always tell
the whole truth or, lie to escape criticism when it is highly unlikely you will
get caught. Suppose the rule you choose in this case is always to tell the
whole truth. This rule, in Kantian terms, is the maxim by which your act, of
telling the truth, is determined. Acting on a maxim, then, is somehow different
from acting on impulse. Here, is an important point on which to reflect: What
does Kant mean when he says the moral worth of action lies in its maxim?
Next, in demonstrating his third proposition, Kant argues that
“duty is the necessity of an action done from respect for the law.” Kant
postpones discussion of what law he is referring to, but implies that, whatever
it is, it commands the will of a rational person internally and without
exception. Philosophers often use the term ‘objectively’ to describe this
phenomenon: the moral law, according to Kant, commands the will objectively.
Indeed, this is what acting from duty is, according to Kant. In a footnote to
his main text, Kant discusses the concept of respect and acknowledges the
possible criticism that, because it is a feeling, he seems to have contradicted
himself. He insists, however, “Respect is properly the conception of a worth
which thwarts my self-love.” (189 footnote) As such, the feeling of respect to
which Kant is referring is unlike all other feelings we have—it is, to use
another philosophical term, ‘disinterested’,because it is generated from reason
alone (what can be called pure practical reason).
Finally, Kant discusses the law itself: the law that is supposed
to command the good will purely and absolutely; that is, without qualification
or exception of any subjective internal (emotions) or external subjective
(pressure from others) or objective (the criminal law) sort of pressures.
But what kind of law can that be, the conception of which must
determine the will without reference to the expected result? . . . Since I have
robbed the will of all impulses which could come to it from obedience to any
law, nothing remains to serve as a principle of the will except universal
conformity of its action to law as such. (189)
In his next move, Kant concludes, based on what he has left
himself to work with, that the moral law which he has in mind must be
completely abstract and self-reflective (not refer to anything outside itself).
This moral law is: Act only according to maxims (or rules or policies) which
can be made into universal laws.
Acting under rules or policies that are intended to give you
some advantage over others could never have moral worth because doing so
requires that you make an exception of yourself, and because it involves acting
from an inclination to succeed that advances on the bases of others’ mistakes
or failures. Such conduct is immoral, according to Kant.
Review Questions
We will review Kant’s reasoning in greater philosophical detail
when we consider his discussion in the Second Section of Foundations. For now,
answer the following Study Questions before proceeding to the next reading.
1.
Early in the discussion in the
“First Section” of the Foundations, Kant argues that
reason, not instinct, rules the wills of rational people. What does he say to
support this claim? If you were someone who disagreed with it, what objections
would you raise against his argument?
2.
What are the three propositions of
morality according to Kant? Briefly summarize his argument in support of each
and give one possible objection to each.
3.
Kant defines a maxim as the rule
or policy that determines the conduct of a rational human being. Taking into
consideration what he has to say about a good will, speculate on what Kant
means when he says the moral worth of an action lies in its maxim. Next, what
does it mean to ‘universalize’ a maxim? Give an example which illustrates this
process.
4.
What part do motives play in
Kant’s ethics? Do you think he overstates their role in morality?
Reading
Assignment
1.
Read the “Second Section: Transition
from the Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysics of Morals” (191 to 206) in your textbook. It is
unlikely that very many of Kant’s readers today regard the discussion in the
“First Section” as recognizably popular. However, you will immediately note a
difference in Kant’s discussion style in the “Second Section.”
2.
Read the commentary on it in the Study
Guide
3.
You may find the Second Section
more difficult to process and therefore have to re-read a few times before
things begin to come clear. Do not be discouraged if, after re-reading, you are
still having difficulty: your tutor will be happy to help.
The Moral Law
In the “Second Section” of the Foundations,
Kant lays out a much more formal, more abstract account of the theory of moral
duty than he sketched in the “First Section.” He has already argued that we
imply, when we invoke the concept of morality, even in everyday conversation,
the idea of a rule that we think all rational beings ought to follow,
regardless of the consequences of doing so. Tell the truth, keep your promises,
and don’t cheat the customer are maxims that we have adopted in this vein. We
are not perfect, of course, and sometimes find ourselves unable to resist the
pressure to make exceptions of ourselves or others to these rules. But in
Kant’s view, it may be immoral to do so and, in any case, it renders our
actions morally worthless.
Kant reminds us of the concept of the good will.
A perfectly good will, therefore, would be equally subject to
objective laws (of the good), but it could not be conceived as constrained by
them to act in accord with them, because, according to its own subjective
constitution, it can be determined to act only through the conception of the
good. Thus no imperatives hold for the divine will or, more generally, for a
holy will. (192)
To be constrained by a law presupposes an impulse or desire to
violate the law. The will of a human being is affected by many forces and is
therefore constrained in this sense. Kant uses this concept of a perfectly good
will to establish a contrast with human wills. For humans, who are not God, but
have all manner of desires and who can be weak in their commitments, to be
constrained by a law presupposes an impulse or desire to violate the law. Since
the will of a human being is affected by many forces and can be weak, it must
be (and feels) constrained to act in accordance with moral imperatives. But a
perfect will, Kant argues, while determined by the moral law (because that's
what it means to be a rational will), would never be constrained by the moral
law, because it by definition lacks any impulse or desire to violate the moral
law.
Kant begins the “Second Section” with the by now familiar idea
that duty is the fulfilment of a law, command, or imperative, and he proceeds
to analyze the concept of ‘imperative’ in philosophical terms. He first
distinguishes between two main types of imperative: ‘hypothetical’ and
‘categorical’. To understand how Kant came up with these types of imperative,
it is important to understand that he sees himself engaged in a priori
reasoning in the “Second Section” whereas he was engaged in a posteriori
reasoning in the “First Section.”[22]
In the “First Section,” Kant began from descriptions of ordinary
experience and drew conclusions about moral reasoning based on that experience.
Kant uses a posteriori (dependent on experience) reasoning in this case. In the
“Second Section,” however, Kant begins from an idea, duty, and analyzes it
logically or in a priori (independent of experience) fashion.
In the “First Section,” Kant began from descriptions of ordinary
experience and drew conclusions about moral reasoning based on that experience.
Kant uses a posteriori (dependent on experience) reasoning in this case. In the
“Second Section,” however, Kant begins from an idea, duty, and analyzes it
logically or in a priori (independent of experience) fashion.
Even if there were no humans to experience morality, Kant
assumes that the idea of a rule or law to govern the conduct of rational beings
would still exist. Further, there are two different ways in which such a rule
or law could apply. Either a rule applies depending on the circumstances
(hypothetical imperative) or applies regardless of the circumstances
(categorical imperative). There can be no in between. Kant assumes we can know
this about rules even if we have no experience of them: that it follows
directly from the very idea of a rule.
Hypothetical imperatives, or ones that apply depending on the
circumstances, also come in two varieties. These are hypotheticalimperatives
of skill and
hypothetical imperatives
of prudence. Imperatives of skill apply when a rational agent wants
to develop or improve the skill in question or achieve the goal implied in the
rule. If you want to be a concert violinist, you must practice playing the
violin every day. If you want healthy teeth, you must brush them twice a day.
As imperatives, the “if you want” part of the rule would be dropped: Practice
the violin every day! Brush your teeth twice a day! Imperatives of prudence are
rules we give ourselves and others suggesting means to achieving happiness.
Unlike imperatives of skill, Kant argues, the end implied in an imperative of
prudence is one that every rational being aims at. Not everyone wants to be a
concert violinist, nor is someone necessarily irrational who does not pursue
healthy teeth (they may have none); but every rational person wants to be
happy.
Why then, can’t we make the pursuit of happiness the basis for
moral law? It would be helpful here to be reminded of the suggestions for
reading philosophical texts, especially this one. You will likely find it
helpful to mark the same passages in your text as are cited in what follows.
Kant is not easy to read, but he writes in a highly structured way. By marking
your text and comparing your marks against what the guide cites, you will be
better able to see the structure of Kant’s thought emerging. Kant argues that
each person’s happiness is at least partly unique to that person (partly
subjective); but the basis of the moral law must be universal (completely
objective), as we have seen. It must command, as Kant puts it, categorically,
so regardless of circumstances, not hypothetically or depending on
circumstances. Indeed, Kant says, hypothetical imperatives do not command “in
the strict sense” at all. (195) They are, he says, “to be taken as counsels (consilia)
rather than commands (praecepta) of reason.”
(ibid.) But what about an imperative that commands categorically? What would it
tell us to do? Kant has not given this concept any content so far in the Second
Section. All we know is that it must contain its own object; that is, it must
not have any object outside itself at which the agent aims: not musical skill,
not healthy teeth, not happiness.
Kant reasons that, in order to know the content of the law, one
need only consider two requirements.
. . . if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately
what it contains. For since the imperative contains besides the law only the
necessity of the maxim of acting in accordance with this law, while the law
contains no condition to which it is restricted, there is nothing remaining in
it except the universality of law as such to which the maxim of the action
should conform . . .” (197)
Kant concludes with a formal statement of the categorical
imperative or moral law. “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law.” (ibid.)
From here, Kant illustrates his law with the analysis of four
examples showing four duties following from the categorical imperative: do not
commit suicide, keep your promises, do not squander your talents, be
charitable. Kant argues that committing suicide, breaking promises, squandering
talent, and being uncharitable all involve acting according to policies or
principles that cannot be universalized without causing rift or contradiction
in your will. If you make a promise, it is reasonable for the promisee to
expect precisely the same from you regarding performance that you would expect
of a promisor. If an opportunity presents itself, the taking of which requires
breaking your promise, Kant says you have shifted to a new maxim: Break
promises when a better deal arises. But if this new maxim is universalized, no
one would ever trust anyone else’s promises. If everyone had to follow this new
maxim, promises would no longer be reliable, their performance no longer
secure. Your initial intention, by way of falsely promising, to secure some
good for yourself or some other would be contradicted since such security would
become impossible.
This refusal to accept contradictions in the will, Kant argues,
comprises the central core of morality. To act morally is always and only to
act from duty. To act from duty is always and only to obey rules that pass the
test that the categorical imperative sets for moral maxims. The categorical
imperative cannot imply contradictory rules. So, only if and as long as the
maxim of your act—the policy which it may be said to go under—is consistent
with the categorical imperative, then the act that falls under it is considered
moral. Philosophers sometimes refer to tests like the categorical imperative as
second order rules or principles, which govern more practical maxims that are
in turn referred to as first order principles. We will examine this practice
more closely in the final unit of the course when considering the work of late
twentieth-century moral philosopher R. M. Hare.
The Realm of Ends
In the closing paragraphs of the “Second Section,” Kant
introduces another version of the categorical imperative called the doctrine of
the realm of ends. Kant argues that it follows from the categorical imperative:
act as if the maxim of your act were to become, by your will, a universal law of
nature, that all rational beings are ends in themselves. Three questions
therefore arise for us: (1) what is an end in itself, (2) how is the
proposition “all rational beings are ends in themselves” derived from the
categorical imperative, and (3) what are its practical implications?
To begin with, an ‘end’ in this context is a purpose or the
reason for which something else is done. You may be familiar with the phrase
“means-ends reasoning.” This is the sense of the term end Kant is using here. But what could end
in itself mean? There are many ends which are themselves means to other ends.
Take physical exercise. One means of achieving the goal of engaging in physical
exercise is to buy a bike. But physical exercise is not an end in itself. It is
a means to achieve health and vitality. Some will argue health and vitality are
not ends in themselves either, but rather means to happiness. As we will see in
the next part of the course, Aristotle believed happiness was the only end in
itself. Kant would agree (as far as imperatives of prudence are concerned) that
happiness is an end in itself. However, Kant would not agree that it is a
‘moral’ end in itself. The only moral end in itself is the rational agent or
person.
Beings whose existence does not depend on our will but on
nature, if they are not rational beings, have only relative worth as means and
are therefore called “things”; on the other hand, rational beings are
designated “persons,” because their nature indicates that they are ends in
themselves, i.e., things which may not be used merely as means. Such a being is
thus an object of respect . . . (201)
How is the idea that people are ends in themselves derived from
the first formulation of the categorical imperative? This is more complicated.
The categorical imperative commands you to act only on maxims that you can
universalize. It implies that morality requires you to assume every rational
being to be capable of acting from duty—that is, has the same sort of internal
moral life you have. Acting from duty often implies acting against your
internal, subjective inclinations (fear, jealously, hunger) as we have seen,
and also acting against pressures, both objective and subjective, from without
(criminal law, religious authority, peers). There is nothing, Kant argues, that
qualifies a will as moral other than its own internal, objective principle of
volition. The rational or moral will is, therefore, self-legislating or
governing. Perhaps when you were a child, you had occasion to remind a bossy
friend, “You’re not the boss o’ me!” For Kant, my rational will is the ultimate
boss o’ me: not the rules of my society, not the desires of my parents or peers
or anybody else, not even my own feelings. When he says people are ends in
themselves, Kant means moral persons (or persons for short) are reducible to
their rational wills. And every rational will, being equal to and the same as
every other rational will, as Kant argues, is worthy of equal respect as an end
in itself.
What practical implications might the realm of ends principle
have? Kant argues it follows immediately that we ought never to treat others as
mere means to our own ends; rather, we ought to treat all people as ends in
themselves. What does this mean?
Review Questions
1.
Describe and explain the difference
between a categorical and a hypothetical imperative according to Kant. Give
examples of both. Do you agree with Kant about the possibility of categorical
command?
2.
Describe and explain Kant’s
concept of immorality as a conflict in the will of the agent. Then, subject the
maxim “Do unto others as I would have them do unto me” to the categorical
imperative test and determine whether you think Kant would consider it moral or
immoral.
3.
Describe and explain Kant’s idea
of the realm of ends. Could it include five-year-old children? Either way,
would this be a problem for his theory? Justify your answer.
4.
Kant argues that it follows
immediately from the principle of the realm of ends that we ought never to
treat others as mere means to our own ends. Rather, we ought to treat all
persons as ends. What does this mean? Can you think of any exceptions you would
want to make to this principle?—On what grounds?
5.
Do you agree that Kant’s theory is
based entirely on reason and not at all on feeling? Justify your answer.
6.
What are some similarities between
Plato’s and Kant’s concepts of morality or the good?
Comments
Post a Comment